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ADMINISTRATIVE FLEXIBILITY AND THE FAA:
THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF
UNITED STATES REGISTRATION OF
FOREIGN-OWNED AIRCRAFT*
E. ELLSWORTH MCMEEN, III**
JOHN J. SARCHIO*

T

**

HE PERVASIVE nature of governmental involvement in the
private sector has given rise to a conventional wisdom that

identifies "overregulation" as the source of most contemporary
domestic difficulties. Recent scholarship and commentary have
roundly denounced government regulation as, inter alia, anticompetitive, inflationary, causative of business failure, and damaging
to productivity and incentive.' The deleterious impact of govern*© Copyright 1980 by E. Ellsworth McMeen, III and John J. Sarchio. All
rights reserved. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the law firm with which they both are affiliated.
** A.B. 1969, Harvard; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania. Member,
New York Bar.
*** B.S. 1976, Bucknell; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania. Member,
New York Bar.
'See, e.g., Eberle, Reforming the Regulatory Process, J. INST. SOClOECON.
STUD., Winter, 1979 at 37, 40:
Overregulation of all sectors of society is placing an enormous
economic and social burden on the United States economy ...
The excessive, often arbitrary, imposition of economic, health
and safety, and social regulations on the private sector has seriously
eroded the effectiveness of the U.S. economy, fueled an unacceptably high rate of inflation, raised the costs of production, reduced
productivity, inhibited technological innovation and retarded economic growth-very often without achieving sufficient benefits
to offset these enormous costs to this nation's economic health.

Certain types of excessive government involvement in the economy have severely fueled inflation. The overregulation of some
areas of this country's economy is progressively eroding the capital
base through premature capital equipment changes, costs of mandated production changes, costs of restrictions on operation and
drags on innovation and productivity.

2

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[46

ment regulation in general has been examined and re-examined.!
The demise of Nader-inspired consumer-protective regulation has
Other commentators are equally, if not as colorfully, vocal. See, e.g., Breyer
& MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 943 (1973) ("[T]he harms regulation has
produced so far outweigh the benefits of lower price that gas price regulation
at the wellhead should be substantially abandoned."); Green & Nader, Economic
Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871,
871 (1973) ("[Olur unguided regulatory system undermines competition and
"); MacLaury, Taming
entrenches monopoly at the public's expense .....
Government Regulation, 50 N.Y.S. BAR J. 385, 415 (1978) ("When the business economists met last fall, some 28 percent nominated government regula[T]he productivity gain from
tion as the worst problem facing the economy ....
1974 to 1975 would have been larger ... had it not been for the costs to industry
); L. Loevinger, The Impact of Governof. . . health and safety regulations ....
ment Regulation, at 59 (unpublished transcript of lecture delivered at New York
University College of Business and Public Administration on October 25, 1978,
on file with the authors) ("Government regulation almost always increases
costs, inhibits innovation, reduces productivity, [and] restrains competition .... ").
Perhaps the most recently celebrated and widely disseminated contention that
federal regulation is a primary cause of business failure has stemmed from the
financial difficulties of the Chrysler Corporation. See, e.g., Can Chrysler be
Saved?, NEWSWEEK, August 13, 1979, at 52 ("[Tlhe government was mostly to
blame for the company's troubles because of its overzealous regulation of pollution, safety and energy standards."); Chrysler's Quest for Federal Welfare,
FORTUNE, August 27, 1979, at 30 ("Chrysler['s] pitch [was] that its weakening
position has not been caused by chronic management failures . . . [but rather
by government] regulations, which hit Chrysler harder than G.M. or Ford.");
Is Chrysler the Prototype?, Bus. WEEK, August 20, 1979, at 102, 104 ("[A] large
part of the responsibility for Chrysler's plight must . . . rest with the government's well-meaning but shortsighted efforts to do good through regulation ...
'What's happening to Chrysler is just a symptom . . . . The disease is excessive
regulation of American industries.'" (quoting Murray L. Weidenbaum, director
of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in
St. Louis, Missouri)).
Other literature on the subject abounds. See generally Eastman, We Can
Do More than Just Talk About Motor Carrier Regulatory Reform, 46 I.C.C.
PRAc. J. 669 (1979); O'Neill, Competition Policy and Regulation: The Case of
Motor Carrier Protest Standards, 45 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 569 (1978); Comment,
Regulatory Reform: Will an Injection of Competition Cure the Patient?, 52 TUL.
L. REV. 363 (1978); sources cited in note 2 infra.
2See generally, e.g., COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY OF THE ABA,
FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (1978); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT REGULATORY ACTIVITY: JUSTIFICATIONS,
PROCESSES, IMPACTS, AND ALTERNATIVES (1977); W. MOORE, REGULATORY RE-

R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971); Breyer, Analyzing
Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979); Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); Davis, Surface Transportation RegulationA Succinct Analysis, 47 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 55 (1979); Eberle, supra note 1; Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211
(1976) (highly technical economic analysis); Wriston, Warning: The Law May
FORM (1976);
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been calmly noted.' Various deregulatory efforts actually have
been consummated," to the accompaniment of loud, but possibly
premature,' acclaim. It cannot be denied that, carrying the banner

of the "public health and welfare," government regulation often
has created public and private ills.
In contrast to the regulatory excesses that have supplied fuel

for the anti-regulation bandwagon, one recent regulatory effort
stands out as an example of intelligent and beneficial decisionmaking, and it therefore is instructive in its message that regulation is not inherently evil and that prudence and caution should
temper anti-regulatory fervor. On October 29, 1979, ' the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA)' issued Amendments Numbers
47-20 and 45-11 (Final Regulation) 8 to the then-existing FAA
regulations governing aircraft registration and aircraft identification markings, respectively.! The Final Regulation was promulbe Hazardous to Society's Health, 50 N.Y.S. BAR J. 96 (1978); L. Loevinger,
supra note 1.
'See Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1
(1979) ("Consumer protection is everywhere in retreat.").
4
E.g., Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 33013432 (Supp. 11 1978)) ("deregulating" the wellhead price of natural gas); Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1552 (West Supp. 1980)) (focusing on
economic regulation of commercial airlines by the Civil Aeronautics Board).
For a detailed explanation of the analyses that preceded the enactment of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, see STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
ADMIN. PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT ON CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (Comm. Print

1975).
5The beneficial effects of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 have been questioned. See, e.g., Erck, Current

Major Developments in Federal Natural Gas Legislation and Regulation, in 30
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX. 155, 156 (1979) ("During the constant publicity
in 1978, .

.

. [the Natural Gas Policy Act] was called a 'deregulation' bill.

The facts are to the contrary."); One Year Alter
Hit a Downdraft, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 104
of airline economic deregulation).
'This was the date of publication in the Federal
of the regulation was January 1, 1980. See note 117
'The

Deregulation: The Airlines
(questioning the aftereffects
Register. The effective date
infra.

FAA promulgates regulations on behalf of the Secretary of Trans-

portation. See note 71 infra.
8See 44 Fed. Reg. 61,937 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5§ 45.33,
47.1-.19 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as Final Regulation].
914 C.F.R. §§ 45.1-.33, 47.1-.71 (1979). Although the Final Regulation
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gated pursuant to a congressional mandate set forth in the recentlyenacted amendments (Amendments) 1" to section 501(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (1958 Act), 1 which liberalized the
then-existing aircraft registration provisions of the 1958 Act to
allow for the registration of aircraft owned by aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States (green-card
aliens) and aircraft owned by corporations that were not "citizens
of the United States" (noncitizen corporations)." Because Congress
considered the Amendments to be self-explanatory and (with the
exception of a single required definition) self-contained," it directed
the Secretary of Transportation" merely to "define the term 'based
and primarily used in the United States' "' as it related to aircraft
owned by noncitizen corporations.
This Article will trace, in the context of the development of
the Final Regulation, the course of the creation and exercise of
regulatory power-from the genesis of the governing statutory
provisions, through the shifts and starts of congressional lawmaking, to the promulgation and refinement of regulatory "law"and will provide evidence that it was the broad powers of the
administrative agency in this case, and the intelligent and reasoned
exercise thereof, that comprised the means by which Congress'
laudable but unfocused intent was fashioned into a body of workable and reasonable governing guidelines.
affected both parts 45 and 47 of 14 C.F.R., this Article is concerned exclusively

with the portion of the Final Regulation that amended the aircraft registration
provisions, codified at 14 C.F.R. §

47.1-.71 (1980).

"0 Pub L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977) (the "1977 Amendment"); Pub. L. No. 95-241, 92 Stat. 119 (1978) (the "1978 amendment").
The sole purpose of the 1978 Amendment was to eliminate an undesirable and
unintended restriction contained in the 1977 Amendment. See text accompanying
notes 62-68 infra.

1149 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976)

(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b)

(West Supp. 1980)).
" The respective meanings of the terms "person" and "citizen of the United

States" are integral to this Article, and are defined and discussed at text accompanying notes 125-33 infra.

"See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
'4See
15Pub.

note 71 infra.

L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977)

(current version

at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West. Supp. 1980)). For a full discussion of the
legislative history of this section, see text accompanying notes 16-70 infra.
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
GOVERNING AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION

A. The OriginalProvision
The statutory provision governing the eligibility of aircraft for
registration in the United States was first enacted as section 3(a)
of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (1926 Act)," an extensive
legislative effort that initiated federal regulation of civil aeronautics. The original section 3(a), which precluded registration
of foreign-owned aircraft, provided, inter alia, as follows:
No aircraft shall be eligible for registration (1) unless it is a
civil aircraft owned by a citizen of the United States and not
registered under the laws of any foreign country, or (2) unless it
is a public aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
Territory, or possession, or of a political subdivision thereof. . .. "'
The legislative history of this provision18 indicates that its essence
eAir Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 568, 569 (1926)
(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980)). Section 3(a)
subsequently was recast as § 501(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (the
"1938 Act"), ch. 601, § 501(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1005 (1938) (current version at
49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1979)), an even more extensive piece of
legislation, which created a Civil Aeronautics Authority to perpetuate and
expand the regulation of privately-owned aircraft. See note 26 infra and text
accompanying notes 21-23 infra. In turn, § 501(b) of the 1938 Act was reenacted as S 501(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the "1958 Act"),
Pub. L. No. 85-726, 5 501(b), 72 Stat. 731, 777 (1958) (current version at 49
U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980)), which created the Federal Aviation
Administration and further expanded the scope of federal regulation of civil
aircraft. See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra. Section 501(b) of the 1958
Act continued in force verbatim until the amendments discussed at text accompanying notes 18-70 infra.
1 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 568, 569 (1926)
(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West. Supp. 1980)).
18The forerunner of § 3(a) first appeared, in substantially
different form,
as S 4(b) of S. 2815, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922), the bill that was Congress'
very first legislative attempt to regulate civil aeronautics. Section 4(b) of S.
2815 provided that "the Commissioner of Civil Aviation shall by regulation
provide for . . . (b) The registration, identification, inspection, certification, or
licensing of all civil aircraft." The citizenship restriction first appeared in the
next incarnation of the registration provision, § 6 of S. 3076, 67th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1922), which provided as follows:
[N]o civil aircraft shall be used in commerce unless owned by a
person who is a citizen of the United States or its dependencies, and
in the case of a partnership unless each member is such citizen:
Provided, That in the case of a corporation or association no
such aircraft shall be owned by such corporation of [sic] association unless the president and board of directors or the managing
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was derived from analogous provisions of the Shipping Act of
1916,"9 and that its purpose was to ensure that civil aircraft could
officers thereof, as the case may be, are citizens of the United
States and the corporation or association itself is organized under
the laws of the United States, or of a State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof, and 75 per centum of the interest therein is
owned by citizens of the United States.
In the next version of the bill, H.R. 13715, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923),
the registration provision was separated from the definition of "citizen of the
United States," and was further refined, as follows:
The Secretary [of Commerce] shall by regulation provide for the
registration of aircraft as civil aircraft of the United States; but no
aircraft shall be so registered unless (1) it is not registered under
the laws of any foreign country, and (2) it is a civil aircraft owned
by a citizen of the United States ...
Id. at § 222(a).
The language comprising the registration provision passed through three
subsequent unsuccessful draft bills-H.R. 3243, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924);
H.R. 10522, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1924); and S. 76, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1924)
-before coming to rest as § 2(a) of S. 41, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1925),
the bill that eventually was enacted into law as the Air Commerce Act of 1926,
ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976
& Supp. I 1977) and 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1552 (West. Supp. 1980)).
19See H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1925). The relevant
portions of the Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916) (current
version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1-1508 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)), provided as follows:
That within the meaning of this Act no corporation, partnership,
or association shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless
the controlling interest therein is owned by citizens of the United
States, and, in the case of a corporation, unless its president and
managing directors are citizens of the United States and the corporation itself is organized under the laws of the United States
or of a State, Territory, District, or possession thereof.
The provisions of this Act shall apply to receivers and trustees
of all persons to whom the Act applies, and to the successors or
assignees of such persons.
That the [United States Shipping] [B]oard ... may charter, lease,
or sell to any person, a citizen of the United States, any vessel ...
[that it has] purchased, constructed, or transferred.
That any vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the board
may be registered or enrolled and licensed . . . as a vessel of the
United States and entitled to the benefits and privileges appertaining thereto; Provided, That foreign-built vessels admitted to
American registry or enrollment and license under this Act. . ..
and vessels sold, leased, or chartered to any person a citizen of
the United States, as provided in this Act, may engage in the
coastwise trade of the United States.
When the United States is at war, or during any national emergency the existence of which is declared by proclamation of the
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easily be requisitioned for military use in the interest of the national defense:
Registered aircraft of the United States will serve as an auxiliary
air force in time of war. It is, therefore, desirable that such aircraft
be in fact controlled by citizens of the United States in order that
possession of them may be readily obtained by the United States
in time of war and that the aircraft be in suitable condition."

The substance and effect of section 3(a) of the 1926 Act were
perpetuated when the provision was recast?' as section 501 (b) of
President, no vessel registered or enrolled and licensed under the
laws of the United States shall, without the approval of the board,
be sold, leased, or chartered to any person not a citizen of the
United States, or transferred to a foreign registry or flag. No vessel
registered or enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United
States, or owned by any person a citizen of the United States, except
one which the board is prohibited from purchasing, shall be sold
to any person not a citizen of the United States ....
That the President, upon giving to the person interested such
reasonable notice in writing as in his judgment the circumstances
permit, may take possession, absolutely or temporarily, for any
naval or military purpose, of any vessel purchased, leased, or
chartered from the board; Provided, That if, in the judgment of
the President, an emergency exists requiring such action he may
take possession of any such vessel without notice.
Id. at § 2, 7, 9, 10.
It is obvious that the 1926 Act relied heavily upon precedent contained in
the Shipping Act of 1916. In addition, however, H.R. REP. No. 1261, supra at
26, indicates that the 1926 Act also was modeled after, yet was more restrictive
than, the International Air Navigation Convention of 1919, art. 5-8, 3 TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS & AGREEMENTS, BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND OTHER POWERS, 1910-1923, 3768, 3773-74 (1923), 11 L.N.T.S. (No.

297) 173, 190-91 (1922), the relevant portions of which provided as follows:
No contracting State shall . . . permit the flight above its terri-

tory of an aircraft which does not possess the nationality of a
contracting State.
Aircraft possess the nationality of the State on the register of
which they are entered ....
No aircraft shall be entered on the register of one of the contracting States unless it belongs wholly to nationals of such States.

No incorporated company can be registered as the owner of an
aircraft unless it possesses the nationality of the State in which
the aircraft is registered, unless the president or chairman of the
company and at least two-thirds of the directors possess such
nationality, and unless the company fulfils all other conditions
which may be prescribed by the laws of the said State.
An aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State.
20 H.R. REP. No. 1262, supra note 19, at 26.
21 See note 26 infra.
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the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (1938 Act),' which provided
as follows:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States and is not
registered under the laws of any foreign country; or
(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
Territory, or a possession of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, or of a political subdivision thereof.'
The language contained in section 501 (b) of the 1938 Act
was re-enacted as section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act, ' and continued in force unamended until 1977.' During the period from
1926 to 1977 (with the exception of the years 1934 to 1938), '
within which the registration provision remained in effect substantially unaltered from its original state, its incompatibility with
other bodies of aviation law, as shown infra, permitted aliens
and noncitizen corporations to sidestep the thrust of the provision,
thereby highlighting the absence of a consistent and equitable
federal policy governing the ownership and use of aircraft by
foreign individuals and entities.
Section 602 of the 1958 Act provided that "[a]ny person may
2 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, S 501(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1005 (1938)
(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980)). See note 16

supra.

ICivil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 501(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1005 (1938)
(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980)).
"4 Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 501(b), 72 Stat. 731, 777 (1958) (current version
at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West. Supp. 1980)). See note 16 supra.
' The amendments to the 1958 Act are discussed at text accompanying notes
33-70 infra.

'In 1934, responding to an increasing number of requests by green-card
aliens for the passage of private acts that would enable them to register their
aircraft, Congress amended § 3(a) of the 1926 Act to vest in the Secretary of
Commerce the power selectively to grant such registration requests: "[T]he Secretary may, if he deems it advisable, grant limited registration to aircraft owned
by aliens under such conditions as he may by regulation prescribe, but aircraft
granted such limited registration shall not be permitted to engage in interstate
or foreign air commerce." Ch. 654, § 3, 48 Stat. 1113, 1113-14 (1934).
The legislative history of this amendment reveals the delightfully pragmatic
rationale underlying its enactment: "The amendment to subdivision (a) of section 3 permits granting limiting registration of aircraft owned by aliens. We
not infrequently have requests for such registration and in most cases there is
no good reason for denying them." 17 CONG. REC. 12,203 (1934) (remarks of
Mr. Maloney). Despite the persuasive power of this irrefutable logic, the more
restrictive version of the registration provision was included in the 1938 Act.
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file with... [the FAA] an application for an airman certificate";"7
the term "person" as defined in section 101 of the 1958 Act was
broad enough to include individuals who were not citizens of the
United States." Thus, alien airmen were able to obtain licenses
to pilot aircraft registered in the United States, but, under section
501 (b) of the 1958 Act, they were not permitted to own the
aircraft they were permitted to pilot.
A further legislative anomaly was created by section 1108(b)
of the 1958 Act, which permitted, under appropriate circumstances, "[f]oreign aircraft, which are not a part of the armed
forces of a foreign nation, . . . [to be] navigated in the United
States by airmen holding certificates or licenses issued or rendered
valid by the United States. 29 Pursuant to this provision, alien airmen who obtained United States pilot licenses could own and
operate in the United States aircraft that were registered under,
and subject to, the laws of foreign jurisdictions, but could not,
under section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act, register those same aircraft in the United States. This inconsistency had the potential to
undercut aircraft safety in the United States-an avowed purpose
of all major federal civil aircraft legislation since and including
the 1926 Act ° 9- by removing such foreign-registered but United
2749 U.S.C. § 1422 (1976).
The 1938 Act contained an identical provision.
See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 602(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1008
(1938). The 1926 Act did not preclude the licensing of alien airmen. See Air
Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, §§ 3(c), 9(k), 11(a)(4), 44 Stat. 568, 569, 574
(1926).
2See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(32) (West Supp. 1980) ("'Person' means any
individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock
association, or body politic; and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee, or other
similar representative thereof.").
2949 U.S.C. 5 1508(b) (1976). The 1926 Act contained similar provisions,
see Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 568, 572 (1926), which
remained in force until the enactment of § 1108(b) of the 1958 Act. See also 14
C.F.R. §§ 375.1-.70 (1980) (issued pursuant to § 1108 of the 1958 Act).
" The 1926 Act required the Secretary of Commerce to "[p]rovide for the
rating of aircraft of the United States as to their airworthiness." Air Commerce
Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3(b), 44 Stat. 568, 569 (1926). An express purpose of
the 1938 Act was "to promote the development and safety and to provide for
the regulation of civil aeronautics." Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973, 973 (1938). The 1958 Act had as one of its several purposes the
goal "to provide for the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in such manner
as to best foster its development and safety, and to provide for the safe and
efficient use of the airspace." Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 85-726,
72 Stat. 731, 731 (1958).
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States-operated aircraft from the ambit of FAA maintenance
specifications.'
In addition, as a practical matter, the prohibition against registration of foreign-owned aircraft could be circumvented by employing a rental arrangement, whereby alien individuals or noncitizen corporations could, instead of owning the aircraft they
operated in United States commerce, merely lease aircraft that
were owned and registered by United States citizens.
For the reasons discussed above, it became apparent that section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act not only was failing to effectuate its
original purposes but was visibly at odds with other federal laws.
In addition, section 501 (b) unwittingly swept within its proscriptive ambit a class of individuals (namely, green card aliens) that,
in the eyes of other federal law," had ceased to be "foreign."
B. The 1977 and 1978 Amendments
In response to this state of affairs, remedial legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1975, in the form of
H.R. 3647.' The original draft of H.R. 3647 contemplated that
the eventual legislation would be entitled the "Resident Alien
Aircraft Registration Act of 1975," ' the avowed purpose of which
was "[t]o amend [section 501 (b) of] the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 to permit aliens holding permanent residence visas to register aircraft in the United States."' The amended version of section 501 (b) would have read as follows:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States or an individual
citizen of a foreign country who has been lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States and such aircraft is not

registered under the laws of any foreign country; or
3' The maintenance specifications contained in 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.161-.177 (1980)
by definition apply only to "the maintenance, preventative maintenance, and
alteration of U.S. registered civil aircraft." Id. at 5 91.161 (emphasis added).
32
E.g., the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1557 (1976),
contrasts the status of being foreign with that of having been "lawfully admitted
for permanent residence." See id. at § 1101(a)(15).
-"H.R. 3647, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
a'Id. In subsequent drafts of H.R. 3647, the title was amended to read "An
Act To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 relating to eligibility for aircraft registration," which title belies the simplicity of the bill's original purpose.
35Id.
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(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, or the District of

Columbia, or of a political subdivision thereof.'

For reasons not satisfactorily addressed in the legislative history, H.R. 3647 was "limited in applicability to individuals, not
companies," as a "wise safeguard."' 7 Thus, the thrust of the bill
was to "permit aliens who have been admitted to the United

States for permanent residence to register their aircraft with the
Federal Aviation Administration-much as they now register their
automobiles in the States in which they reside."3 The author of

the bill, Mr. Goldwater,' explained the restrictive registration
provisions of section 501 (b) as "an accident of legislation" rather
than a provision that had "any real national interest"; a mere
"quirk in the law .

.

. [that] needs to be corrected."" The bill

easily passed the House of Representatives, but although the operative inconsistencies of section 501 (b) were set forth fully in the
report that accompanied H.R. 3647,' the bill failed to be con' See H.R. REP. No. 94-1580, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) (emphasis in
original).
8 122 CONG. REC. 31,614 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Jones).
38Id. at 31,613 (remarks of Mr. Snyder).
3'It is worth noting that H.R. 3647 was introduced by Congressman Goldwater, Senator Goldwater's son, in the House of Representatives. When a successor bill to H.R. 3647-H.R. 735-cleared the House and moved on for consideration by the Senate, see text accompanying notes 42-52 infra, the father-son
relationship gave rise to a cameo appearance by Goldwater, senior:
Mr. GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the only interest I have in
this bill, and I shall certainly not object to it, is that it was offered
by my son in the House of Representatives. It is not very often
that a father in the Senate can be present to vote on a bill offered
by his son. I have some reason to be proud of him on this, because
it is a long-needed piece of legislation.
I thank the majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I congratulate both the
father and the son. They are both entitled to congratulations.
123 CONG. REC. S7373 (daily ed. May 11, 1977).
10 122 CONG. REC. 31,613-14 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Snyder).
4 H.R. REP. No. 94-1580, supra note 36, at 2. The report observed as follows:
Under present law persons not citizens of the United States cannot register aircraft in the United States. Section 501(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1401) makes it unlawful for any person to operate or navigate any aircraft eligible for
registration if such aircraft is not registered by its owner, or to
operate or navigate within the United States any aircraft not eligible
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sidered by the Senate and was not enacted into law during the
Ninety-Fourth Congress.
Undaunted, the proponents of H.R. 3647 introduced an identical bill, H.R. 735,' in the House in 1977. On the strength of the
same rationale and arguments that had been marshalled to obtain
passage of H.R. 3647 in the previous year,"3 H.R. 735 breezed
through the House and would, if enacted, have amended section
501 (b) of the 1958 Act to focus solely on individual green-card
aliens, as follows:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States or an individual citizen of a foreign country who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and such
for registration. Section 501(b) limits eligibility to (1) those aircraft owned by a citizen of the United States, (2) those aircraft
not registered under the laws of any foreign country, and (3) those
aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State, Territory, or
possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia or of
a palitical [sic] subdivision thereof.
A foreign national can own and operate an aircraft within the
United States provided it is registered in another country and provided that person complies with any permits, orders or regulations
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to section 1108(b)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1508(b)). This
has not been a satisfactory solution for permanent residents of the
United States who wish to base their aircraft here. This is because
the aircraft must be maintained in accordance with the airworthiness requirements of the country of registry, including periodic
maintenance and inspection. It is often difficult, if not impracticable, for a foreign national to contract with qualified mechanics
and repair stations in the United States in order to meet the particular requirements of the country of registry.
With respect to airman licensing there is no parallel problem.
A foreign national can obtain a U.S. pilot license and a Federal
Communications Commission permit to operate the radio transmitters aboard aircraft. The anomaly of the present law is that a
foreign national can legally fly a U.S. registered aircraft in the
United States, but he or she is prevented from owning an aircraft
of U.S. registry.
Id.
H.R. 735, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
'Compare H.R. REP. No. 95-16, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977) and
123 CONG. REC. H1253-54 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1977) with H.R. REP. No. 94-1580,
supra note 36, at 2 and 122 CONG. REC. 31,613-14 (1976).
In a minor deviation from his remarks of the previous year, Rep. Goldwater
described H.R. 735 as "not hav[ing] a major impact on the aviation community."
123 CONG. REC. H1254 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1977). In retrospect, this observation
seems to have been premature. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 162-216 infra.
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aircraft is not registered under the laws of any foreign country;
or
(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, or the District of
Columbia or of a political subdivision thereof."
This time around, the Senate considered the bill. Recognizing
the problems that existed under section 501 (b),' and adopting in

substantial part the House's analysis and explanation bf the
bill," the Senate nevertheless expanded the scope of H.R. 735
to include not only green-card aliens, but also noncitizen corporations." The initial Senate version of H.R. 735 would have
amended section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act to read as follows:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States or an individual citizen of a foreign country who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or a corporation lawfully organized and doing business under the laws
of the United States or any State thereof and such aircraft is

not registered under the laws of any foreign country; or
(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, or the District of
Columbia or of a political subdivision thereof.48
The legislative history of H.R. 735 in the Senate contains no
statement of the reasons why the subject matter of the billgreen-card aliens-was broadened to include noncitizen corporations; the report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation that accompanied H.R. 735 in the Senate
appears to take it for granted that the House version of the bill
"See H.R. REP. No. 95-16, supra note 43, at 4 (emphasis in original).
4See S. REP. No. 95-96, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977); 123 CONG. REC.
S7373-74 (daily ed. May 11, 1977). These sources essentially recite the same
factors noted in H.R. REP. No. 94-1580, supra note 36. See also notes 41 and
46 inlra and accompanying text.
"Compare S. REP. No. 95-96, supra note 45, at 1-2 and 123 CONG. REC.
S7373-74 (daily ed. May 11, 1977) with H.R. REP. No. 95-16, supra note 43,
at 1-2 and 123 CONG. REC. H1253-54 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1977).
47See 123 CONG. REC. S7373 (daily ed. May 11, 1977) (adding noncitizen
corporations to the registration provision); S. REP. No. 95-96, supra note 45, at
1-2.
48 See S. RPP. No. 95-96, supra note 45, at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
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was intended to cover noncitizen corporations as well as individual
green-card aliens.'9
Subsequent debate on the Senate version of H.R. 735 produced
an additional amendment designed to limit noncitizen corporations'
registration privileges only to those of their aircraft that were
"based or primarily used in the United States.""0 Senator Byrd explained the purpose of this additional provision as follows:
[T]his amendment is designed to clarify the Secretary of Transportation's powers to condition registration of an aircraft on reasonable inspection by FAA personnel in the United States. The
FAA might otherwise have to send personnel abroad to inspect
an aircraft registered in the United States to assure compliance
with U.S. requirements."
In other words, having granted noncitizen corporations the right
to register their aircraft in the United States, the Senate was now
concerned with problems of administration that would arise if a
foreign corporation decided to base and operate its aircraft abroad,
beyond the reach of the FAA's day-to-day ability to examine such
aircraft to ensure compliance with United States standards of
maintenance and safety. With the addition of this amendment,
the version of H.R. 735 that eventually passed the Senate would
have amended section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act to read as follows:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1) It is owned by a citizen of the United States or an individual citizen of a foreign country who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or a corporation lawfully organized and doing business under the laws
of the United States or any State thereof so long as such aircraft
is based or primarily used in the United States and is not registered under the laws of any foreign country; or
(2) It is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
49 Id. The statement of purpose contained in S. REP. No.
95-96, supra note
45, provided that "[t]he purpose of H.R. 735, as reported, is to permit citizens
of foreign countries who have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in the United States and corporations lawfully organized and doing business
under the laws of the United States or any State thereof, to register aircraft in
the United States." Id. at 1.
50123 CONG. REc. S7373 (daily ed. May 11, 1977) (adding this feature to
H.R. 735).

51Id.
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Territory, or possession of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, or of a political subdivision thereof."'

It might appear that the registration provisions were near to becoming reality. However, despite finally having passed both houses

of Congress, H.R. 735, in the form set forth above, was not enacted
into law.

The green-card alien/noncitizen corporation registration provisions made their next legislative appearance as a small, unre-

lated section of H.R. 6010," a House bill that originally was intended merely to amend the 1958 Act to provide for aviation war
risk insurance.' The original version of H.R. 6010 contained no
reference to the registration provisions; the Senate inserted into
the bill an amended and expanded version of H.R. 735, which
had cleared both houses, but had not been enacted, during the pre-

vious session of Congress. In justifying the inclusion of such a disparate provision in a bill ostensibly focused upon aviation insurance, Senator Cannon explained that the amendment was needed to
stimulate "more favorable possibilities for sale of U.S.-manufactured aircraft both to foreign nationals residing in the United
States and foreign corporations doing business in the United
States."'
11See S. REP. No. 95-96, supra note 45, at 4-5; 123 CONt. REC. S7373
(daily ed. May I1, 1977) (emphasis added).
-H.R. 6010, 5 14, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). In its final form, H.R.
6010 represented a compendium of the contents of several precursor bills, among
them, the following: H.R. 26, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("To amend the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide improved notice to the public of
changes in air carrier fares"); H.R. 27, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("To
amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to authorize reduced fare transportation on a space-available basis for elderly persons, and for other purposes");
S. 1325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("To amend § 406(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1376) to provide explicit statutory authority for
the payment of 'flow-through' subsidies pursuant to an experimental program
administered by the Civil Aeronautics Board during the period August 1, 1973
through July 31, 1975"). The original purpose of H.R. 6010 itself was "[tlo
amend Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to expand the types of
risks which the Secretary of Transportation may insure or reinsure, and for
other purposes." H.R. 6010, supra.
54 See note 53 supra.
5123 CONG. REC. S17,533 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1977). This sweetener was
gleaned from the Senate report accompanying H.R. 735, S. REP. No. 95-96,
supra note 45, at 2, which observed that leasing of aircraft by noncitizen corporations led to loss of revenue for domestic aircraft manufacturers because leasing was more expensive than purchasing. Of course, this rationale bears little
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The new version of the registration provisions embodied several
features that differed from the version that comprised H.R. 735.
First, the Senate attemptede to split into separate clauses the provisions relating to individual green-card aliens and noncitizen corporations, respectively. Second, the term "based or primarily used"
as it pertained in H.R. 735 to aircraft owned by noncitizen corporations was amended to read "based and primarily used."'
Third, the new provision contained a mandate to the Secretary
of Transportation to define the new "based and primarily used"
language by administrative regulation, although the Senate downplayed the importance of this portion of the amendment by observing that it was not "require[d] that DO' issue any rules, under
this provision prior to registering aircraft under the new procedures.""9 None of the reasoning behind any of these alterations
is revealed by the legislative history of H.R. 6010.
The conference committee on H.R. 6010 approved the Senate's
registration provisions without comment." The bill became law
(1977 Amendment) on November 9, 1977, and contained the
following amended version of section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1)(A) it is(i) owned by a citizen of the United States (other than a
corporation) or by an individual citizen of a foreign country
who has lawfully been admitted for permanent residence in the
United States; or
(ii) owned by a corporation lawfully organized and doing
business under the laws of the United States or any State thereof
so long as such aircraft is based and primarily used in the
resemblance to the original intent behind the registration provision. See note 41
supra and text accompanying notes 33-52 supra.
"See note 63 infra and text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
57 The question arises whether the conjunctive formulation may be read as
an attempt to create a more restrictive limitation upon registration; a secondary
question is whether it in fact did so. See text accompanying notes 230-34 infra.
5"See note 71 infra.
50 123 CONG. REC. S17,535 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1977) (remarks of Senator
Cannon). In deemphasizing the need for the prompt promulgation of regulations, and restricting the scope of its mandate to the FAA, Congress was indicating that it viewed the registration legislation as self-explanatory, self-contained,
and administrable in the absence of further guidelines.
'1 See H.R. REP. No. 95-773, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3396, 3398.
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United States; and
(B) it is not registered under the laws of any foreign country;
or
(2) it is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
territory, or possession of the United States or the District of
Columbia or a political subdivision thereof.
For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation
shall, by regulation, define the term "based and primarily used in
the United States."'"

This brand-new law was flawed from the outset. In splitting the
green-card alien provision and the noncitizen corporation provision into separate clauses, the 1977 Amendment inadvertently'
swept into its proscriptive ambit all corporations that were "citizens
of the United States" and required, as a precondition to registration, that the aircraft in question be "based and primarily used
in the United States."'" Under the 1977 Amendment, corporations
that were citizens of the United States and that owned aircraft for
use primarily overseas no longer would be permitted to register
those aircraft. This obviously never was the intent behind the
registration provisions."
In response to this legislative gaffe, and supported by outcries
from domestic industry,"3 remedial legislation was introduced in
61 Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977).
12 Congress' mistake was admitted by Rep. Johnson, who attributed it to the
Senate. See 124 CONG. REC. H1283 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1978).
"It can be argued that the split formulation of the registration provision
contained in the 1977 Amendment did not itself effect the erroneous result, but
rather merely crystallized an ambiguity inherent in the version of the registration
provision contained in the Senate edition of H.R. 735, see text accompanying
note 52 supra. In paragraph (1) of the H.R. 735 Senate version, the clause "so
long as such aircraft is based or primarily used in the United States and is not
registered under the laws of any foreign country," although intended to modify
only the phrase "a corporation lawfully organized and doing business under the
laws of the United States or any State thereof," may be read also to modify
the phrase "citizen of the United States or an individual citizen of a foreign
country who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States." If the latter interpretation is subscribed to, then the H.R. 735 formulation itself required as a precondition to registration that all aircraft, whether
owned by citizens or noncitizens, be "based or primarily used in the United
States."
"See note 65 infra and text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
"See 124 CONG. REC. H1283 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1978) (remarks of Mr.
Snyder):
Attorneys representing aircraft financing institutions have taken
the position that the alien aircraft registration provisions of H.R.
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the next session of Congress, in the form of H.R. 10368" and its
companion bill, S. 2516."7 Both the House and the Senate reports
accompanying these bills succinctly stated that the bills' single
purpose was "to amend section 501 (b) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 . . . to clarify that aircraft registered by 'citizens of
the United States'. . . are not required to be based and primarily
used in the United States in order to be eligible" for United States
registry."
The bills quickly cleared their respective houses and, on March
8, 1978, the House version, H.R. 10368, became law (1978
Amendment)." The 1978 Amendment revised section 501 (b) of
the 1958 Act to read as follows:
ELIGIBILITY FOR REGISTRATION
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if(1)(A) it is(i) owned by a citizen of the United States or by an individual citizen of a foreign country who has lawfully been admitted for permanent residence in the United States; or
(ii) owned-by a corporation (other than a corporation which
is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized and doing
business under the laws of the United States or any State
thereof so long as such aircraft is based and primarily used in
the United States; and
(B) it is not registered under the laws of any foreign country;
or
(2) it is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
territory, or possession of the United States or the District of
Columbia or a political subdivision thereof.
For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation,
shall by regulation, define the term "based and primarily used
in the United States.""0
6010 (Public Law 95-163) contain language which cast [sic] doubt
on the eligibility of aircraft operated by U.S. international air
carriers for U.S. registration-if such aircraft are based abroad.
We have been persuaded that those contentions have some merit
-although, of course, our intention in H.R. 6010 was never to
affect the status of such aircraft one way or the other.
"H.R. 10368, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
17 S. 2516, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
08 H.R. REP. No. 95-868, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-637,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
9 Pub. L. No. 95-241, 92 Stat. 119 (1978).
-49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980).
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Congress finally had achieved its goals of allowing green-card
aliens and noncitizen corporations to register their aircraft in the
United States. All that remained for the FAA, on behalf of the
Secretary of Transportation, was the apparently simple task of
defining the term "based and primarily used in the United States."
II. BACKGROUND, SCOPE AND INTENT OF THE FINAL REGULATION
The broad authority of the FAA 1 to promulgate rules and regu71 Pursuant to the Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670,
80 Stat. 931 (1966), which established the Department of Transportation headed
by the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), the rulemaking authority of the
Administrator of the FAA was transferred to the Secretary, as follows:
There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Secretary all
functions, powers, and duties of the Federal Aviation Agency, and
of the Administrator and other officers and offices thereof, including the development and construction of a civil supersonic
aircraft: Provided, however, That there are hereby transferred to
the Federal Aviation Administrator, and it shall be his duty to
exercise the functions, powers, and duties of the Secretary pertaining to aviation safety as set forth in sections 306, 307, 308, 309,
312, 313, 314, 1101, 1105 and 1111, and titles VI, VII, IX, and
XII of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. In exercising these enumerated functions, powers, and duties, the Administrator shall be guided by the declaration of policy in section 103
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. Decisions of
the Federal Aviation Administrator made pursuant to the exercise
of the functions, powers, and duties enumerated in this subsection to be exercised by the Administrator shall be administratively
final, and appeals as authorized by law of this Act shall be taken
directly to the National Transportation Safety Board or to the
courts, as appropriate.
Id. at 5 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. at 938. The Secretary, however, has by regulation
outlined the areas of responsibility of the FAA, and formally delegated to the
Administrator of the FAA broad rulemaking authority in the area of civil
aeronautics, as follows:

The Federal Aviation Administration . . . [ius responsible for-

(1) Promulgating and enforcing regulations on all safety matters
relating to the manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft;
(2) Registering aircraft and recording rights in aircraft;
(3) Developing, modifying, testing, and evaluating systems, procedures, facilities, and devices needed for the safe and efficient
navigation and traffic control of aircraft;
(4) Locating, constructing or installing, maintaining, and operating Federal aids to air navigation, wherever necessary;
(5) Developing air traffic regulation, and administering air traffic
control of civil and military air operations within U.S. airspace;
(6) Providing grants-in-aid for developing public airports; and
(7) Promoting and encouraging civil aviation abroad through
technical aviation assistance to other governments.
The Federal Aviation Administrator is delegated authority to-_
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lations governing civil aeronautics derives in the main from sections 307 and 313 of the 1958 Act,"' which provide, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The ... [FAA] is authorized and directed to develop plans for
and formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the
navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations
as . . . [it] may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of
aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace. [The FAA]
...may modify or revoke such assignment when required in the
public interest."3
The . . . [FAA] is further authorized and directed to prescribe
air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft, for
the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, ...
and
for the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace . . .
The ... [FAA] is empowered to perform such acts, to conduct
such investigations, to issue and amend such orders, and to make
and amend such general or special rules, regulations, and procedures, pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of . . .
[the 1958] Act, as . . . [it] shall deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of, and to exercise and perform . . . [its] powers and
duties under . . . [the 1958] Act."
Against the backdrop of these broad grants of administrative
discretion, it is easy to understand how Congress' narrow mandate
to the FAA to define, for purposes of the Amendments, the term
"based and primarily used in the United States" was expanded
into the comprehensive and far-reaching result that is the Final
Regulation."6
(a) Carry out the powers and duties transferred to the Secretary of Transportation by sections 6(c)(1) of the Department of
Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1655(c)(1)), including those pertaining to aviation safety set forth in sections 306, 307, 308, 309,
312, 313, 314, 1101, 1105, and 1111 and titles VI, VII, IX, and XII
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended.
49 C.F.R. §§ 1.4(c), 1.47(a) (1978). Thus, although the power to promulgate
rules and regulations pertaining to civil aeronautics is statutorily vested in the
Secretary, and Congressional mandates are directed accordingly, the actual rulemaking function has been delegated to, and is performed by, the Administrator
of the FAA.
7249 U.S.C. §§1348, 1354 (1976).
3
Id. at § 1348(a).
74
1d. at § 1348(c).
75 d. at § 1354(a).
76 Final Regulation, supra note 8.
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Although Congress had accompanied the enactment of the new
registration provisions with the confident declaration that it was
not "require[d] that... [the FAA] issue any rules under this provision prior to registering aircraft under the new procedures,'
the FAA moved quickly to issue an interim rule, Special Federal
Aviation Regulation 39 (SFAR 39), which, pending the adoption of a final governing regulation duly promulgated in observance of the time-consuming precepts of the Administrative Procedure Act,79 would expressly permit registration of aircraft owned
by noncitizen corporations under circumstances in which the
contacts of such aircraft with the United States were, in the
view of the FAA, of the most substantial kind."° Citing sections
313 and 501 of the 1958 Act 8' as general authority for the enactment of SFAR 39, the FAA justified this departure from standard
rulemaking procedure on the ground that SFAR 39 was in the
nature of "an interpretive rule and a statement of general policy
... [and therefore] notice and public procedure are not required
and . . .good cause exists for making it effective in less than 30
days."n Although thus placing SFAR 39 above reproach, the FAA
nevertheless noted its intention "to review operating experience
under the special regulation,"" and therefore "invited [interested
persons] to submit such written data, views or arguments as they
may desire regarding this SFAR."8 Even though the FAA was out" 123 CONG. REC. S17,535 (daily ed. Oct 20, 1977)
Cannon). See note 59 supra.
7844
7'

(remarks of Senator

Fed. Reg. 38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SFAR 39].

Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), repealed and

superseded by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8, 80 Stat. 378, 632 (1966)

(current ver-

sion at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
The exercise of the rulemaking power by the FAA is expressly made subject
to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 1348(d)
(1976). Said provisions require, inter alia, that the agency publish a general

notice of proposed rule making in the Federal Register, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(1976); that interested persons be given the right to participate in the rulemaking, id. at § 553(c); and that at least 30 days elapse before a rule, once
published, becomes effective, id. at § 553(d).
8'See text accompanying notes 217-24 infra.

8149 U.S.C. § 1354, 1401 (1976)

(current version of § 1401 at 49 U.S.C.A.

S 1401 (West Supp. 1980)).
S2SFAR 39, supra note 78, at 39.
93 Id.

84

Id. Although the FAA went so far as to import into the ambit of the SFAR
proceeding the Administrative Procedure Act notion of public participation in
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side the ambit of procedural requirements governing public comment on proposed regulations, it nevertheless was ready, willing,
and able to respond to reasoned suggestions regarding its temporary limited action.
SFAR 39 itself was, as mentioned above, deliberately focused
only upon the most immediately troublesome aspect of the new
registration provisions; the meaning of the term "based and primarily used in the United States."'" Reading into the legislative
history of the Amendments Congress' intent thereby to preclude
the use of the United States registry as a "flag of convenience,""'i
the FAA fashioned an interim rule, stating that
[c]ontrary provisions of Part 47 of the Federal Aviation Regulations notwithstanding, an aircraft is eligible for registration pursuant to Section 501(b) (1)(A) (ii)and (B) of the . . . 1958

[Act] if it is:
(a) Owned by a foreign corporation which is lawfully organized
and doing business under the laws of the United States or any
State thereof;
(b) To be exclusively operated in the United States during the
period that it is registered in the United States; and
(c) Not registered under the laws of any foreign country during the period that it is registered in the United States."
In formulating this special rule, the FAA evidenced both the
proposed rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. S 553(c) (1976), no comment on SFAR 39
was received. See Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,938.
"'See SFAR 39, supra note 78, at 38.
" Id.
at 38-39. The only possible justification for this interpretation of the
intent behind the amendments occurs in the legislative history of the Senate's
addition of the "based and primarily used" language to H.R. 735, supra note 42.
The "based and primarily used" language was needed "to clarify the Secretary
of Transportation's powers to condition registration of an aircraft on reasonable
inspection by FAA personnel in the United States. The FAA might otherwise
have to send personnel abroad to inspect an aircraft registered in the United
States to assure compliance with U.S. requirements." 123 CONG. REC. S7373
(daily ed. May 11, 1977) (remarks of Senator Byrd). It seems clear that the
"based and primarily used" requirement was added in the interest of administrability of the new, liberal registration provisions, see text accompanying note
51 supra, and that the FAA's "flag of convenience" rationale thus was a strained
interpretation of Congressional intent. It may be argued, however, that the
FAA's "flag of convenience" rationale, which justified the promulgation of
regulations that precluded access to the American registry by foreign corporations whose aircraft had only tenuous contacts with the United States, is the
protective approach that Congress should have taken.
87SFAR 39, supra note 78, at 39.
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willingness to give substance to the intent of Congress, and the
ability to move rapidly to deal with what the FAA considered to be
an obvious case for expanded registration eligibility." Even in the
context of a temporary rule, the FAA, on the basis of its pragmatic
insight and its broad administrative authority, identified and developed reasonable guiding principles for dealing with issues that
Congress had not explicitly identified.
Simultaneously with the issuance of SFAR 39,89 the FAA issued

a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Proposed Regulation),"
which set forth the rules that the FAA felt were logical and necessary corollaries to the Amendments. A description of the areas
treated in the Proposed Regulation is necessary in order to appreciate fully the magnitude of the task that devolved upon the
FAA in the guise of Congress' deceptively simple instruction to
define the term "based and primarily used in the United States."
At the threshold, the FAA's own description of the scope of the
Proposed Regulation is instructive:
This notice proposes to amend Part 47 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations to provide for: (1) the registration of aircraft by an
individual citizen of a foreign country who has been lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States; (2) the
registration of aircraft by a corporation (other than a citizen of
the United States) lawfully organized and doing business under
the laws of the United States or any State thereof, if the aircraft
is based and primarily used in the United States; and (3) a definition of "based and primarily used in the United States." Additionally, certain technical amendments are now to be made. These
involve aspects of registration by partnerships, trustees, and corporations that use voting trusts, the substitution of the term "person" where appropriate, and the provision for immediate termination of a certificate when eligibility has ceased."1
Although SFAR 39 had been focused exclusively upon one
interim application of the term "based and primarily used in the
United States"-the definition of which term was the specific task
that Congress felt required administrative attention-the FAA in
1It also evidenced the eclipsing of the "basing" portion of the requirement
by the "exclusive use" criterion. See text accompanying notes 223-24 infra.
"9Both SFAR 39 and the Proposed Regulation were issued on December 22,
1978.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 63 (1979).
91Id. at 64.
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the Proposed Regulation in effect anticipated the logical consequences of the Amendments, and expanded the scope of its rulemaking to contemplate the solutions to the problems those consequences posed.
At the outset, the FAA noted that "[n]either revised Section
501 (b) [of the 1958 Act] nor the Federal Aviation Regulations
define the term 'individual citizen of a foreign country who has
lawfully been admitted for permanent residence in the United
States.' ". Absent a definition of this key term, it would have been
impossible fairly and equitably to administer the new registration
provisions in the case of green-card aliens. Accordingly, the FAA
undertook an examination of relevant immigration law, 8 and distilled a workable two-pronged test:
[I]t will be sufficient, for the purposes of proof of eligibility for
aircraft registration, for a foreign citizen with permanent residency
status to identify the applicant's assigned alien registration number on the application for aircraft registration, in addition to a
representation of having been lawfully admitted as a permanent
resident of the United States."
Inasmuch as the citizenship of an applicant corporation was
relevant to a determination of its eligibility to register aircraft,
the FAA undertook a "citizenship analysis" in the corporate context, and proposed to require as a precondition to registration that
"a noncitizen corporation . . . provide evidence with an application for aircraft registration, that it is lawfully organized and doing
business under the laws of the United States, or any State thereof."'"
Having disposed of the threshold question of nature and proof
of citizenship of individuals and corporations in general, the FAA
next turned to the central task of the Proposed Regulation: the
definition of the term "based and primarily used in the United
States." Reiterating the proposition that the legislative history of
this term revealed that it was intended to preclude use of the
.. Id.

This term was utilized in the 1977 Amendment in connection with

eligibility for registration of aircraft owned by green-card aliens. See Pub. L. No.
95-163, S 14, 91 Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977).

"Ild. See Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64 (discussing the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976)).
9'Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64. See also id. at 66.
95Id. at 64.
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United States registry as a "flag of convenience, ' the FAA proposed a "sixty percent test" that focused upon the percentage of
use, not basing, in the United States:
The FAA has determined that the percentage of flight hours in
the United States is the most effective method of determining where
an aircraft is based and primarily used. The FAA believes that the
phrase "based and primarily used in the United States" implies
that only those aircraft which are operated at least 60 percent of
the time in the United States are eligible for registration. The 60
percent figure represents a judgment as to the figure which permits
the greatest amount of flexibility to the registrant while being
consistent with the [1958] Act. 7
A flexible standard consistent with the 1958 Act having been
proposed, questions of administration of the standard arose. First,
in reference to what period of time must an aircraft owned by a
noncitizen corporation be utilized at least sixty percent in the
United States? This question was resolved by requiring that, "in
any 180 consecutive day period, 60 percent of the total flight
hours of the aircraft must be spent in the United States."'"
Second, although the term "United States" was defined in the
1958 Act,"8 the question arose whether to count toward the sixty
percent requirement hours accumulated in flights that originated
in the United States but terminated abroad, or that originated
abroad but terminated in the United States. In response to this,
[t]he FAA interpret[ed] "used in the United States" to include
all non-stop (except in emergencies and for purposes of refueling)
flights between two points in the United States. Therefore, although an aircraft may be in flight over the high seas or over a
neighboring country during a non-stop flight between two points
in the United States, all of the flight hours accumulated during
such a flight are considered flight hours accumulated in the
United States."
"See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64. See also id. at 67.
" Id. at 64. See also id. at 67. The 180-day period subsequently was amended
87

to a six-month period in response to industry comments. See Final Regulation,
supra note 8, at 61,937-38. See also id. at 61,940.
99See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(41) (West Supp. 1980) ("'United States' means
the several States, the District of Columbia, and the several Territories and pos-

sessions of the United States, including the territorial waters and the overlying
airspace thereof.").

"0 Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64-65. See also id. at 67.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Third, the question arose whether to require that a prospective
registrant demonstrate compliance with the sixty percent test as
a precondition to registration. Due probably to considerations of
verification,

[t]he FAA . . . concluded that the determination of whether
an aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States is
prospective from the time that it is enrolled in the U. S. registry.
In other words, the "based and primarily used" restriction is
applicable only during the period that the aircraft is registered
in the United States. 10
Finally, the question arose as to verification of registrants' compliance with the sixty percent test. In order to reduce the administrative burden on the FAA, the Proposed Regulation required
[t]he registered owner or operator of a U.S. aircraft . . . to keep
records of the total time in service of the airframe . . [and] the
total flight hours in the United States of the aircraft . . . [, and]
require[d] that a report be submitted to the FAA Aircraft Registry
at the end of each 180-day period indicating total time in service
of the airframe and total number of flight hours in the United
States during that period.'
The FAA's response to the issues that were implicit in the sixty
percent test demonstrates a comprehensive approach to difficult
questions, and a concern for economy and administrability. But
the FAA's treatment of inchoate difficulties extended beyond the
"based and primarily used" formula to resolve ambiguities inherent
in the term "citizen of the United States" itself. Section 101(16)
of the 1958 Act defines the term "citizen of the United States" to
mean
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of
its possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each member is such
an individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, of which the president and two-thirds or more of the board of directors and other
managing officers thereof are such individuals and in which at
least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or controlled
10' Id. at 65. See also id. at 67.

12 Id. at 65. See also id. at 67.
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by persons who are citizens of the United States or of one of its
possessions."
The FAA foresaw little difficulty in administering the new registration provisions with respect to individuals and partnerships.'"
But implicit in the definition of a corporate citizen under section
101 (16) (c) of the 1958 Act were difficulties in administering the
registration provisions with respect to voting trusts and registration in the name of a trustee. A discussion of the substance and
effect of the FAA's disposition of these issues is to be found in
Section III of this Article.' At this point, it will suffice to observe
that, from a procedural standpoint, the FAA's approach to the
identification and solution of problems raised by the 1977 and
1978 Amendments led to far greater an exercise in administrative
rulemaking than Congress had anticipated in its simple directive
to define the term "based and primarily used in the United
States."'"
In the discussion preceding the text of the Proposed Regulation,
the FAA invited "[i]nterested persons . . . to participate in the
making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data,
views, or arguments as they may desire."'"7 Several of the points
raised in the five comments that were received 8 were utilized by
the FAA as a basis for amending certain provisions of the Proposed
Regulation. For example, in response to the voting trust provisions of the Proposed Regulation,"'9 one commentator contended
that "the regulation should not prohibit non-qualifying foreign
beneficiaries from participating (in common with other participants) in the ordinary management or direction of the trust so
long as the requisite 75 percent control is vested in U.S. citizens
10349

U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).

o4"See Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64-65. For a discussion of the
formulation of the provisions dealing with individuals and partnerships, see text
accompanying notes 138-50 infra.
'*'See text accompanying notes 118-248 infra.
'"oThe FAA also considered and proposed rules dealing with the duration
of certificates of registration, and made conforming technical amendments to
other FAA regulations that would be affected by the proposed Regulation. See
Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 65-66. See also id. at 67-68.
107 See id. at 63.

See Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,937.
I See Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 65, 67.
508
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and other qualified beneficiaries. 1.. The FAA responded to this
comment by amending the voting trust provisions to
make . . .it clear that persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor

resident aliens may exercise up to 25 percent of the aggregate
power to direct or remove a trustee. In addition, the rule makes
it clear that those persons may have a beneficial interest in the
trust that exceeds 25 percent of the aggregate beneficial interests."1 t
Similarly, in response to the provision of the Proposed Regulation that would have required compliance with the sixty percent
requirement in each 180-day period,"' two comments, one quoted
below, observed that
[t]his requirement could work a considerable hardship on the
operator. Worldwide economic conditions affecting the corporation
not a United States citizen could dictate the use of the aircraft. For
example, during the first 6-month period, a crisis may develop
that requires many trips between the U.S. and the country of the
corporation's principle [sic] ownership. The next six months may
see an almost exclusive use of the aircraft inside the U.S. So in a
year's time, the overall operations may even out.... .'

Although rejecting a one-year rule, the FAA noted the proposal
and stated that, "[a]fter further consideration in light of these
110Letter from law firm of Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams to the
Federal Aviation Administration (March 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Perkins,

Coie Letter].

" Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,938. Compare id. at 61,939-40 (final
version of voting trust provisions) with Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 67
(proposed voting trust provisions).
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64, 67.
1
Letter from Shell Oil Company to the Federal Aviation Administration
1
(February 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Shell Letter]. See also Letter from
National Business Aircraft Association, Inc. to the Federal Aviation Administration (February 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NBAA Letter], which uses almost
identical language to make the same point:
The requirement to achieve 60% of the flight time in a 180 day
period could work a considerable hardship on an operator. Worldwide economic conditions affecting the foreign-owned corporation
could dictate the use of the aircraft. For example, during the first
six month period, a crisis may develop that requires many trips
between the U.S. and the corporation's home country. The next
six months may see an almost exclusive use of the aircraft inside
of the U.S. So in a year's time, the overall operations may even
out. . ..
The similarity in language is revealing evidence of "cooperation" among commentators.
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comments the FAA has decided that the basic period for the rule
without
should be 6 calendar months. This will simplify the rule
14
making the period so long that the rule may be abused.'
The foregoing examples of the FAA's responsiveness to public
comment on its proposals is not intended to imply that the FAA
conforms its proposals wholesale to the demands of the more vocal
elements of the public. In fact, the majority of the points raised
in the comments received by the FAA were not utilized in amending the Proposed Regulation."' Nevertheless, to the credit of the
FAA, all the comments received were acknowledged and discussed,
and the reasoning behind the adoption or refutation of the points
raised therein was clearly set forth.""
The comments received from the public in response to the Pro-

posed Regulation were aggregated with the internal amendments
generated by the FAA in the course of its own review process and,
on October 29, 1979, the Final Regulation was published in the
Federal Register."'
III. THE FINAL REGULATION: PROBLEMS SOLVED
AND ISSUES RAISED

A. Statutory Mandate and Statutory Limitations

As discussed above,"' the simple idea of extending the privilege
of owning United States-registered aircraft to green-card aliens
was born, died, was reborn, and eventually developed into a specific
"'Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,938. Compare id. at 61,940 (final
version of noncitizen corporation provisions) with Proposed Regulation, supra
note 90, at 67 (proposed noncitizen corporation provisions).
"' For example, one comment observed that the Proposed Regulation should
be amended to allow noncitizen corporations to "[olperate demonstrator aircraft on the U.S. Registry . . . [and] [flerry new aircraft for delivery to U.S.
purchasers from . . . [points abroad] to the United States on the U.S. Registry."
Letter from British Aerospace, Inc. to Federal Aviation Administration (February
28, 1979). Another comment proposed that "basing" rather than "operation"
be the decisive factor in determining eligibility for U.S. registry, so that it
would be possible to "lease aircraft from as well as to foreign air carriers."
Letter from Flying Tiger Line to Federal Aviation Administration (January 23,
1979) (emphasis in original). For the reasoning behind the FAA's rejection of
these and other comments, see Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,937-38.
"' See Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,937-38.
"' Id. at 61,937. The effective date of the Final Regulation was January 1,
1980. See id.
"' See text accompanying notes 33-70 supra.
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statutory directive to the Secretary of Transportation to define by
regulation the term "based and primarily used in the United States"
relative to noncitizen corporations. The FAA responded, as outlined above,"' by issuing regulations of even broader scope.
The discussion will now turn to the specific manner in which
the FAA anticipated and dealt with practical problems of administration raised as a result of the statutory broadening of the privilege of aircraft registration, as well as to the substance of the FAA
action. However, before examining the details of the Final Regulation, we must first analyze the statutory framework for regulation. As will be seen, although it established the statutory and
regulatory machinery for implementing the desired policy, the
1958 Act required certain creative regulatory adjustments and
lubrication in order to function properly.
The Amendments"' spoke to and amended what was in essence
the minor premise of the logical statement contained in the registration provisions of the 1958 Act."' In order to understand the
nature and scope of the FAA action contained in the Final Regulation, we must begin with the major premise: namely, subsection
(a) of section 501 of the 1958 Act. This provision states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or navigate any
aircraft eligible for registration if such aircraft is not registered by
its owner as provided in this section, or (except as provided in

section 1508 of this title) to operate or navigate within the United
States any aircraft not eligible for registration ....

1."

Having established, in subsection (a) of section 501, eligibility
for registration of aircraft as the critical element in the operative
provision, the 1958 Act turns, in subsection (b), to a definition
of eligibility for registration:
(b) An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if-

(I)(A) it is(i) owned by a citizen of the United States or by an individual
"See text accompanying notes 71-117 supra.
"'Pub. L. No. 95-241, 92 Stat. 119 (1978); Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 14, 91
Stat. 1278, 1283 (1977). For a discussion of the background and legislative
history of the amendments, see text accompanying notes 33-70 supra.
(current version of § 1401(b) at 49 U.S.C.A.
121 49 U.S.C. 5 1401 (1976)
1401(b) (West Supp. (1980)).
"'2Id. at § 1401(a).
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citizen of a foreign country who has lawfully been admitted for
permanent residence in the United States; or
(ii) owned by a corporation (other than a corporation which
is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized and doing
business under the laws of the United States or any State thereof
so long as such aircraft is based and primarily used in the
United States; and
(B) it is not registered under the laws of any foreign
country; or
(2) it is an aircraft of the Federal Government, or of a State,
territory, or possession of the United States or the District of
Columbia or a political subdivision thereof.
For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation
shall, by regulation, define the term "based and primarily used in
the United States".

The registration provisions seem clear so far. Upon further
scrutiny, however, certain anomalies start to appear. Subsection
(a) of section 501 of the 1958 Act speaks to registration of an
aircraft "by its owner." However, the 1958 Act contains no definition of the term "own" or "owner," and subsection (f) of section
501 states in unambiguous terms that registration "shall not be
evidence of ownership of aircraft in any proceedings in which such
ownership by a particular person is, or may be, in issue."" The
1958 Act has, accordingly, specifically declined to give federal
recognition or effect to any particular contractual structures developed by private parties with respect to the ownership of aircraft.
The potential breadth and vagueness of the ownership concept
contained in subsection (a) of section 501 contrast sharply with
the more particular rules contained and relationships specified in
subsection (b) of section 501. In terms of the nature of the entities
(other than individuals) affected by the definition of eligibility for
registration, subsection (b) has two focal points. The first is the
concept of "citizen of the United States." This term is defined in
section 101(16) of the 1958 Act as follows:
"Citizen of the United States" means (a) an individual who is
a citizen of the United States or one of its possessions, or (b) a
partnership of which each member is such an individual, or (c) a
1-49 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West Supp. 1980).
1249 U.S.C. S 1401(f) (1976).
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corporation or association created or organized under the laws of
the United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, of which the president and two-thirds or more of
the board of directors and other managing officers thereof are such
individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting
interest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the
United States or of one of its possessions."
The second focal point is the concept of a "corporation (other
than a corporation which is a citizen of the United States) ......
The definition of the term "citizen of the United States" contains reasonably specific provisions; the definition, however, speaks
only to a limited class of legal entities-namely, individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations. The concept of "owner"
in subsection (a) of section 501 of the 1958 Act is not so limited.
In fact, subsection (f) of section 501 refers to "ownership by a
particular person,"' ' and the definition of "person" contained in
section 101 (32) of the 1958 Act is of some breadth: "'Person'
means any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company,
association, joint-stock association, or body politic; and includes
any trustee, receiver, assignee, or other similar representative
thereof. '28 Thus, the 1958 Act has not attempted to provide comprehensive guidance as to the qualification of legal entities, other
than certain individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations, to be owners of United States-registered aircraft. Moreover,
in establishing the rules governing eligibility for registration of
aircraft owned by non-United States citizens, subsection (b) by
its terms speaks only to green-card aliens and noncitizen corporations. The result of this language is that, as a technical matter,
the 1958 Act does not make explicit provision for ownership of
United States-registered aircraft by legal entities not falling within
the categories specified in the definition of "citizen of the United
States" or non-United States citizens that are neither green-card
aliens nor noncitizen corporations.
The Secretary of Transportation 1' does not have explicit statu1-49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).
121Id. at 5 1401(b)(1)(A)(ii).
12749 U.S.C. S 1401(f) (1976).
22849
2

U.S.C.A. § 1301(32) (West Supp. 1980).

For a discussion of the statutory basis for the power of the FAA to
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tory authority to expand or contract the concept of "citizen of
the United States" or the definition of eligibility for registration.
As mentioned above, however, the 1958 Act does not contain a
definition of "owner," and the Secretary of Transportation has
been given broad authority to develop governing regulations and to
establish requirements relative to applications for aircraft registration. Under subsection (g) of section 503 of the 1958 Act, the
Secretary of Transportation is authorized to provide by regulation
for such "records, proceedings, and details as may be necessary
to facilitate the determination of the rights of parties dealing with
civil aircraft of the United States, aircraft engines, propellers,
appliances, or parts.. 8 ° In addition, subsection (d) of section 501
directs that applications for certificates of aircraft registration
"shall be in such form, be filed in such manner, and contain such
information as the Secretary of Transportation may require."'' .
These specific examples of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation are in addition to the general authority granted him under
section 313(a) of the 1958 Act to
perform such acts, to conduct such investigations, to issue and
amend such orders, and to make and amend such general or
special rules, regulations, and procedures, pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as he shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of, and to exercise and perform his
powers and duties under, this chapter."
As a result of the foregoing statutory scheme, and on the basis
of the foregoing statutory authority, the FAA has had to develop
regulations and procedures for dealing with applications for aircraft registration by many different types of legal entities. Accordingly, although the FAA is not explicitly authorized by statute to
define the term "citizen of the United States," the FAA, in order
to be responsive to the realities, of day-to-day industry requirements and developments, has found itself in a position, in essence,
of filling the gaps in, or clarifying, the definition of "citizen of the
United States" contained in section 101 (16) of the 1958 Act," and
promulgate regulations on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, see note
71 supra.
1349 U.S.C. S 1403(g) (1976).
...
Id. at 5 1401(d).

"Id. at 5 1354(a).
"' 49 U.S.C.A. S 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).
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identifying
States" for
Regulation
reasonably

those legal entities that are not "citizens of the United
the purposes of applications for registration. The Final
is tacit acknowledgment of these problems, as well as a
comprehensive set of solutions and guidelines.

B. FAA Action to Define Persons Affected by the Final Regulation, and Problems Raised
An analysis of the substance of the Final Regulation reveals the
process and increasing complexity of regulatory decisionmaking
in the areas outlined above. The complexity and breadth of issues
addressed contrast markedly with the simplicity of the statement
of purpose accompanying H.R. 3647... and bring into sharp focus
the unintended irony of the statement"n in the legislative history" 8
of H.R. 6010 ' to the effect that the statutory amendments were
so clear that the FAA need not act quickly to promulgate regulations. The increasing difficulties faced by the FAA are apparent
from an examination of the provisions relating to green-card
aliens, partnerships, voting trusts, and, finally, trustees.
1. Green-CardAliens
The sole purpose behind H.R. 3647 was to extend the privilege
of ownership of United States-registered aircraft to green-card
aliens, and thereby to eliminate some logical inconsistencies in
the existing law. " ' The problem was clear and limited, and the
solution contained in the Final Regulation is reasonably straightforward. The class of individuals to be benefited had to be identified and defined, and the FAA had to contemplate and provide
for coordination between governmental agencies of the United
States. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act ' created
interesting definitional problems," '8 the identity of the class of persons to be benefited was reasonably easy to establish (namely, as
specified by the 1958 Act, "an individual citizen of a foreign
H.R. 3647, supra note 33. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
See text accompanying note 59 supra.
1
I1d.
131H.R. 6010, supra note 53.
"I See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
- 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976).
14

These problems are discussed by the FAA in the Proposed Regulation,

supra note 90, at 64 (Part IV.A).
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country who has lawfully been admitted for permanent residence
in the United States' "1 and, as specified by the Final Regulation,
such a foreign citizen who is issued, and must furnish on the
application for aircraft registration, an alien registration number
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United
States Department of Justice)."
2. Partnerships
When the Final Regulation moves from the treatment of greencard aliens to the rules identifying each partnership that is a
"citizen of the United States"''" (which rules are discussed briefly
in the Proposed Regulation'" but not expressly in the Final Regulation), the scope and substance of the governing statutory provisions are clear, and the problem facing the FAA is not unduly
difficult. Clause (b) of the definition of "citizen of the United
States" in section 101(16) of the 1958 Act" affords citizenship
status, for the purposes of registration of aircraft, to "a partnership of which each member is such an individual" (namely, an
individual who is himself a "citizen of the United States or one of
its possessions").'" The 1958 Act does not define "partnership"
or "member," and the references in the definition of "person" in
section 101 (32) of the 1958 Act'" to a "firm" and "copartnership"
admittedly do not further the cause of statutory clarity. However,
the 1958 Act does not evidence any congressional intention to
afford greater or lesser benefit to partners as a function of their
limited or unlimited liability for partnership obligations or the
quality of the particular or general rights or immunities created
by local law or in the governing partnership agreement. Within
this statutory framework, the disinclination of the FAA to distinguish between general and limited partners in the context of
applications for registration of aircraft is understandable.
Thus, the FAA merely repeats in regulation form what was
14149 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (b) (1) (A) (i) (West Supp. 1980).
'"Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (5 47.7(b)).
'"Id. (5 47.7(d)).
I"Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 63 (Part V.C.2).
1549
U.S.C.A. 5 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).
14 Id.

-7 Id. at S 1301(32).
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reasonably clear in the statute-except for one matter of needed
clarification, the treatment of which gives a hint of things to come.
Section 101(16) of the 1958-Act " speaks to partnerships, but
only partnerships of which the partners are individuals. Because
the definition of "person" in section 101 (32) of the 1958 Act "'
contains references to individuals as well as to other legal entities,
the 1958 Act could be read to contain an unfortunate conceptual
limitation relating to the ownership of aircraft by partnerships.
The Final Regulation, however, is not so limited. In permitting a
partnership to apply for a certificate of aircraft registration "if
each partner, whether a general or limited partner, is a citizen of
the United States,"'
..' the FAA has established a mechanism for
broader partnership ownership of United States-registered aircraft,
without relinquishing the power to examine the citizenship of each
partner.
3. Voting Trust Arrangements
When the inquiry moves from partnerships to voting trusts, the
subject matter of the Final Regulation shifts from the identification
of a particular type of legal entity that falls within the definition
of "citizen of the United States" to a more difficult issue. This
issue involves, as a given, particular types of legal entities (namely,
"a corporation or association"),"' but requires the understanding
and characterization of the legal relationship that will permit or
preclude such a legal entity from receiving the benefits afforded
to a "citizen of the United States." The statutory waters are a bit
muddy here, but this condition has provided a fertile area for the
growth and development of regulatory means to acknowledge and
accept the attempt of private parties to comply with the conditions
of the 1958 Act.
The relevant statutory provision is clause (c) of section 101(16)
of the 1958 Act."' In addition to requiring a certain percentage
of management of any domestic corporation or association to be
individual citizens of the United States or of one of its possessions,
48

1d.
I at § 1301(16).
Id. at S 1301(32).
"Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (§ 47.7(d)).
15149 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16)(c) (West Supp. 1980).

'

49

5 Id.
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this provision requires that "at least 75 per centum of the voting
interest... [be] owned or controlled by persons who are citizens
of the United States or of one of its possessions.'.'. The general
concept is clear: the management and holders of voting power in

a corporation or association must be scrutinized for foreign influence. However, the terms "voting interest," "owned," and "controlled" (and, for that matter, "citizen") are not defined in the

1958 Act, and the use of the words "owned or controlled," in the
disjunctive, presents a question of construction."' The provision
does specify a percentage of voting power (seventy-five per cent)
that establishes the line of demarcation between United States

and non-United States citizens, but it has remained (and remains)
for the FAA to produce specific rules governing compliance.
The voting trust rules in the Final Regulation acknowledge the
attempt (discussed generally in the Proposed Regulation) 5. of

persons to comply with the general formulation in the statute by
taking rather drastic steps to separate voting power from the other
incidents of stock ownership. The rules are limited to applicants
that are "domestic corporation[s]," but otherwise provide com1

Id.
For example, it cannot seriously be contended that, in the absence of
control, the ownership by a United States citizen of 75% of the voting interest
of a corporation would, of necessity, lead to the conclusion that such corporation is a "citizen of the United States," within the meaning of clause (c) of
101(16) of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).
15 Section C.3 of Part IV of the Proposed Regulation contains the following
discussion of the background of the voting trust rules:
In order to provide guidance to corporations that wish to come
within the scope of Section 101(16) of the [1958] Act through the
use of a voting trust, proposed § 47.7(e) sets forth the position
of the FAA with regard to this matter. The issue of validity of a
voting trust arises, in the context of aircraft registration, when a
corporate applicant meets all of the requirements of Section
101(16), except that 75 percent of the voting interest in the
domestic corporation is not owned or controlled by U.S. citizens.
To satisfy this requirement, control of foreign-owned stock may
be placed in a voting trust, utilizing U.S. citizens and trustees.
The FAA, in determining the validity of a voting trust for the
purposes of registration eligibility, must ascertain that a corporation that wishes to register an aircraft . . . is a citizen within the
meaning of the [1958] Act. In terms of a voting trust, the problem is whether the voting interest of the stock of the corporate
applicant has been so placed in the hands of U.S. citizens as voting
trustees that the trustees have a valid, independent, and bona
fide control of the voting interest.
Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 65.
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prehensive guidance."' Although the voting trust rules do not
purport to speak to every conceivable factual situation, or to an-

swer all questions', they address the major issues that must be
treated in any analysis of the creation, continuance, and termination of legal relationships. These include the existence, provisions,
and binding effect of the instruments creating the relationship (in
this case, the voting trust agreement), the citizenship of all parties, the manner in which power is vested and exercised (in this
case, the exercise by the voting trustee of a "totally independent
"'The voting trust provisions of the Final Regulation are as follows:

S 47.8

Voting trusts.

(a) If a voting trust is used to qualify a domestic corporation
as a U.S. citizen, the corporate applicant must submit to the
FAA Aircraft Registry(1) A true copy of the fully executed voting trust agreement, which must identify each voting interest of the applicant,
and which must be binding upon each voting trustee, the applicant corporation, all foreign stockholders, and each other party
to the transaction; and
(2) An affidavit executed by each person designated as voting trustee in the voting trust agreement, in which each affiant
represents(i) That each voting trustee is a citizen of the United
States within the meaning of section 101(16) of the Act;
(ii) That each voting trustee is not a past, present, or
prospective director, officer, employee, attorney, agent or
any other party to the trust agreement;
(iii) That each voting trustee is not a present or prospective beneficiary, creditor, debtor, supplier or contractor of
any other party to the trust agreement;
(iv) That each voting trustee is not aware of any reason,
situation, or relationship under which any other party to
the agreement might influence the exercise of the voting
trustee's totally independent judgment under the voting trust
agreement.
(b) Each voting trust agreement submitted under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section must provide for the succession of a
voting trustee in the event of death, disability, resignation, termination of citizenship, or any other event leading to the replacement of any voting trustee. Upon succession, the replacement
voting trustee shall immediately submit to the FAA Aircraft
Registry the affidavit required by paragraph (a)(2) of this
section.

(c) If the voting trust terminates or is modified, and the result is less than 75 percent control of the voting interest in the
corporation by citizens of the United States, a loss of citizenship of the holder of the registration certificate occurs, and
§ 47.41(a)(5) of this part applies.
(d) A voting trust agreement may not empower a trustee to
act through a proxy.
Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939-40.
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judgment under the voting trust agreement"'' 7 and, implicitly, in
accordance with customary fiduciary principles), and the actions
or conditions, voluntary or involuntary, that will cause a change
in the legal relationship created (in this case, the "death, disability,
resignation, termination of citizenship, or any other event leading
to the replacement of any voting trustee"), ' and the manner of
succession of the replacement voting trustee. At any time when the
conditions of compliance with the voting trust rules are not fulfilled, the effectiveness of the certificate of aircraft registration
ceases under section 47.41 (a) (5) of the FAA regulations," 9 and
thereupon it becomes unlawful under section 501 (a) of the 1958
Act "for any person to operate or navigate . . . [the affected]
60
aircraft.'
The voting trust rules create a workable approach to analyzing a rather specific solution to a particular citizenship problem
under clause (c) of section 101(16) of the 1958 Act.'' Their
value lies in the quality of their guidance in outlining the elements
comprising this solution. The concepts dealt with in, and the ramifications of, the provisions of the Final Regulation regarding the
concept of trustee ownership of United States-registered aircraft
are of a different order of magnitude entirely.
4. Trustee Ownership of Aircraft
As discussed above, the FAA formulation of the voting trust
rules contained in the Final Regulation represents the development
of a regulatory interpretation of the meaning of "control" of the
"voting interest" of a domestic corporation under circumstances
that are present when a voting trust arrangement is in effect. In
the case of the provisions of the Final Regulation dealing with
trustee ownership of aircraft, the FAA is operating in the absence
of governing statutory provisions on the meaning of United States
citizenship that would recognize the dual legal positions of an
entity appointed and acting as trustee for other persons. In the
case of a non-individual trustee, such entity is organized under
"'Id. at 61,940 (S 47.8(a) (2) (iv)).
18 Id. (S 47.8(b)).
159 14 C.F.R. S 47.41(a)(5) (1980).
1049 U.S.C. S 1401(a) (1976).
16149 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16)(c) (West Supp. 1980).
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and governed by statutory and legal principles pertaining to entities of that type, but, upon accepting a position as trustee under
a trust instrument, such entity assumes different obligations and is
subject to different governing legal principles. Although section
101(16) of the 1958 Act... defines the term "citizen of the United
States" with respect to individuals, partnerships, corporations, and
associations, that provision does not explicitly acknowledge the
fact that an entity, upon accepting a trust, becomes, in essence, a
new and different entity. This distinction is, however, recognized
in the definition of "person" in section 101 (32) of the 1958 Act,
which mentions corporations, associations, and "trustees. 14 3 On
the basis of the foregoing, and in the absence of any indication
in the 1958 Act that the framers desired that the ownership of
aircraft by an entity in its individual corporate capacity should
be governed necessarily by the same principles governing the ownership of aircraft by an entity as trustee for other persons, the
FAA has again found itself in a position of affecting substantive
rights in the context of establishing rules governing applications
for aircraft registration.
Before turning our attention to the scope and substance of the
trustee provisions of the Proposed Regulation and the Final Regulation, it is necessary, in the interest both of completeness and of
illustrating the working of certain statutory provisions, to examine
one familiar situation, involving the holding of legal title to aircraft
by a trustee, that is disposed of by the 1958 Act and FAA practice
without the need to apply the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation. The secured financing of aircraft is often structured in
the form of an equipment trust arrangement whereby a bank takes
and holds title to the aircraft as trustee and issues non-recourse
equipment trust certificates to evidence the loan. The equipment
trust certificates are amortized with the rental income of an aircraft lease between the trustee bank, as lessor, and the user, as
lessee. The lease vests title to the aircraft in the user for nominal
consideration at the end of the lease term, after the equipment
trust certificates have been retired.
The aircraft lease in this type of financing is of critical importance. It determines the legal rights and duties of the parties with
Id. at § 1301(16).
"IJd.
at § 1301(32).
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respect to the title to and the possession of the aircraft, and, as
mentioned above, provides for rentals (payable by the user) sufficient to amortize the debt. The 1958 Act has specifically contem-plated and made provision for this type of financing. The definition
of "conditional sale" contained in section 101(19) of the 1958
Act includes, in clause (b) thereof,
any contract for the . . . leasing of an aircraft ...by which the
. ..lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value thereof, and by which it is agreed that
the ... lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming,
the owner thereof upon full compliance with the terms of the
contract."'
Furthermore, any such lessee is, under said provision, "deemed
15
to be the person by whom any such contract is made or given.""
Although this provision, by its terms, dovetails nicely with the
provisions of section 503(c) of the 1958 Act," rather than with
the ownership provisions of section 501 (a) of the 1958 Act,' 7 the
Final Regulation provides that the term "owner," as used in Part
47 of the FAA regulations,' includes "a lessee of an aircraft under
a contract of conditional sale."'
Title retention agreements of the foregoing nature, or similar in
14Id. at

§ 1301(19).

165
Id.
16649
U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976). This provision of the 1958 Act indicates
the general effect of the filing for recordation of an instrument in the aircraft
registry:
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by subsection (a) of this section shall be valid in respect
of such aircraft . . . against any person, other than the person
by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his
heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until
such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in
the office of the Secretary of Transportation ....

Id.

1'7 1d. at § 1401(a).
16614 C.F.R. SS 47.1-.71 (1980).

The FAA, in the Proposed Regulation, proposed a change in the definition
of "owner" for the purposes of Part 47 of the FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§
47.1-.71 (1979), as a clarification of the then-existing provision, in order to
reflect the actual practice of the FAA. Even though no comment letter submitted
to the FAA in connection with the Proposed Regulation criticized the change
indefinition, the FAA did not adopt the proposed definition, for the expressed
reason that it was not necessary to revise the existing definition at that time.
See Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,938.
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legal consequence to that of the foregoing, have been treated by
the FAA as financings by the lessee (or by the "buyer in possession" or "bailee," as the case may be),"' as owner, in whose name
the aircraft will be registered under the FAA regulations. The
trustee provisions of the Final Regulation do not purport to change
these principles governing contracts of "conditional sale."''1 In
the case of equipment trust arrangements involving the taking and
retention of equity interests in the aircraft by persons other than
the user, and in other types of financings that do not constitute
"conditional sales," the trustee provisions have to be consulted
and complied with. Tracing the course of the trustee provisions
through recent changes in the FAA regulations demonstrates the
genesis and growth of a sound concept and the willingness of the
FAA to formulate logically supportable rules, at the risk of complicating its own administrative handling of aircraft
registrations
7
'
aircraft.1
of
respect
in
instruments
and recordings of
The FAA regulations that were in effect prior to SFAR 39171
reflected the fact that registration of aircraft in the names of
foreign citizens was then prohibited, and the provision of the
regulations pertaining to trustee ownership of aircraft merely recited the documentation to be submitted by a trustee in connection
with an application for registration of aircraft' 7 ' The certificate
of aircraft registration was issuable to the applicant as trustee.
SFAR 39 did not contain provisions relevant to the determination
0

at 61,939 (5 47.5(d)).
On the other hand, it must be said that the FAA does not, in the Final
Regulation, explicitly limit the trustee provisions to situations involving the
holding of "legal title" to aircraft by a trustee that do not fall within the rules
pertaining to "conditional sales."
172Part 49 of the FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 49.1-.55
(1980), entitled
"Recording of Aircraft Titles and Security Documents," establishes the rules for
the recording of "conveyances" and other instruments in respect of aircraft,
under S 503 of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
1- 14 C.F.R. §§ 47.1-.71 (1979) (especially §§ 47.3, 47.5, 47.11).
174 Section 47.11(h) of the FAA regulations stated the following, with respect
to registration of aircraft in the name of a trustee:
The appointed trustee of property that includes an aircraft must
submit either a certified copy of the order of the court appointing
him trustee (if appointed by court order), or a copy of the complete trust instrument (if appointed without court order) certified
as true under § 49.21 of this chapter. The Certificate of Aircraft
Registration is issued to the applicant as trustee.
14 C.F.R. S 47.11(h) (1979).
17

1

1d,
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of when a domestic corporation acting as trustee for foreign beneficiaries ceased to be a "citizen of the United States." Of course,
if a bank acting as trustee was not, in its individual corporate
capacity, a "citizen of the United States" (by reason of foreign
control of its voting stock, for example), the aircraft in question
could, under SFAR 39, have been registered in its name if such
aircraft were to be exclusively operated in the United States during
the period of United States registration.'
In the Proposed Regulation, the FAA formally examined for
the first time the question whether a United States citizen holding
title to aircraft in trust for other persons could be disqualified from
the privilege of aircraft registration by reason of the foreign citizenship of one or more of the beneficiaries of the trust. The Proposed
Regulation contained the following discussion of the trustee problem:
Increased activities of foreign investors in aircraft financing necessitate clarification of trustee registration eligibility, where legal title
to an aircraft is held by a trustee that is a U.S. citizen or an individual foreign citizen lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in the United States, but some or all of the beneficial interest is
held by foreign investors. FAA experience has shown that trust
beneficiaries may wish to exercise various degrees of control over
a trustee under trust agreements submitted with registration applications.
The fundamental issue for registration eligibility is who is the
"owner" of the aircraft within the meaning of Section 501(b)
and (c) of the [1958] Act. FAA practice, as reflected in
proposed § 47.7(c), has been to ignore the scope of economic
participation of foreign beneficiaries if the trust is an active trust
and if the trustee exercises totally independent judgment with
respect to all decisions involving the aircraft. Conversely, the
FAA has previously concluded, in cases involving passive trusts,
where the trustee is strongly controlled by the foreign investor,
that the beneficiaries are the true owners of the aircraft for administrative purposes, and that the aircraft is not eligible for
registration under Section 501 (b) ( 1) (A) (i).17

It should be noted at this juncture that in the foregoing dis15

1 The development of the FAA definition of the term "based and primarily
used in the United States," and the role of SFAR 39 in the development of
such definition, are discussed at text accompanying notes 217-48 infra.
178

Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 65.
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cussion the FAA was concerned with the situation in which a
corporate trustee, although existing as a domestic corporation
and fully meeting the requirements of clause (c) of section
101 (16) of the 1958 Act,177 was nevertheless so subject to control,
in the exercise of its trust powers, by foreign beneficiaries that its
application for aircraft registration had to be denied. The FAA
was not speaking to the converse question: whether a corporation
that was not a "citizen of the United States" might otherwise be
permitted to obtain aircraft registration in its name by reason of
the fact that it had been appointed and was required to act as
trustee for beneficiaries, all or substantially all of whom were
"citizens of the United States."
With the foreign-beneficiary concern in mind, the FAA, in the
Proposed Regulation, required the applicant trustee to determine
whether each beneficiary was a United States citizen (or a greencard alien) or was directly or indirectly controlled by a "foreign
interest" (as defined in the Proposed Regulation).'

If the appli-

cant trustee determined that any such beneficiary was not a United
States citizen (or green-card alien) or was so controlled by a
foreign interest, the applicant trustee was required to submit to
the FAA the following documentation:
(i) One or more affidavits establishing that each trustee is not
aware of any reason, situation, or relationship with either a beneficiary or any foreign interest which could influence or limit the
exercise of totally independent judgment by a trustee;
(ii) A true copy of the trust document with all amendments
establishing that(A) Any trustee has full authority over all matters of administration of the trust, including matters relating to dispositions of
the aircraft, independent of any direction from a beneficiary or
any foreign interest, and
(B) No trustee is subject to direction or removal (except for
cause) by beneficiaries who are U.S. citizens or individual foreign
citizens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States and have among themselves control of at least 75 percent of
U.S.C.A. § 1301(16)(c) (West Supp. 1980).
The final paragraph of § 47.7(c) stated that, for the purpose of the
trustee provisions, "a foreign interest is any person that is not a U.S. citizen
or an individual foreign citizen lawfully admitted for permanent residence in
the United States." Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 67.
17749
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the beneficiaries' aggregate power to give direction to, or effect
removal of, a trustee."1 9
Finally, although the FAA, in the Proposed Regulation, proposed
certain amendments to section 47.41 of the FAA regulations'80
(relating to termination of the effectiveness of aircraft registration
upon the occurrence of certain events), the amendments did not
expressly cover the case of the trustee-registrant.
The issues addressed by, and the analysis contained in, the
trustee provisions of the Proposed Regulation were strikingly similar to those relating to the voting trust provisions. The FAA, again,
did not shy away from treating the substantive issues related to
and arising from the creation, continuance, and termination of the
trustee-beneficiary relationship, including the existence and terms
of the governing trust instrument, the citizenship of all parties,
the creation and exercise of power by the trustee, and the allocation of power between the trustee, on the one hand, and the beneficiaries of the trust, on the other.
Although the Proposed Regulation reflected the grappling by
the FAA with the correct legal issues, the FAA came to find that
certain concepts were unworkable or unnecessary, and that further
clarification and refinement were appropriate. The Final Regulation represents the product of an agency unafraid to confess error,
to make changes based on reconsideration of the problems, and
to act in accordance with sound comments from interested private
parties.
The standard of "totally independent judgment," deemed by the
FAA in the Proposed Regulation to be pertinent not only to voting trustees but also to trustees holding title to aircraft in trust for
other persons, did not reflect the prevailing views in financing
circles regarding the customary role of a trustee for investors,"'
and was abandoned by the FAA. Acknowledging that trustees in
aircraft financings were not expected by investors to act in a
vacuum, the FAA mandated that limitations be placed on the
power of foreign beneficiaries to control the trustee. The concept
of "foreign interests," apparently deemed unnecessary by the FAA,
was also abandoned. In addition, the FAA declared, as a matter of
' Id. at 66-67.

180

d. at 68.

' See, e.g., Perkins, Cole Letter, supra note 110.
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policy, that the percentage limitation on control of the trustee by
foreign beneficiaries did not constitute a limitation on the amount
of the beneficiary interest in a trust that could be held by foreign
citizens. Finally, drafting refinements were made.
The resulting trustee provisions of the Final Regulation read as
follows:
(c) Trustees. An applicant for aircraft registration under section 501(b)(1)(A)(i) of the [1958] Act that holds legal title
to an aircraft in trust must comply with the following requirements:
(1) Each trustee must be either a U.S. citizen or a resident alien.
(2) The applicant must submit with the application(i) A copy of each document legally affecting a relationship under
the trust;
(ii) If each beneficiary under the trust, including each person
whose security interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust,
is either a U.S. citizen or a resident alien, an affidavit by the
applicant to that effect; and
(iii) If any beneficiary under the trust, including any person
whose security interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust,
is not a U.S. citizen or resident alien, an affidavit from each trustee
stating that the trustee is not aware of any reason, situation, or
relationship (involving beneficiaries or other persons who are not
U.S. citizens or resident aliens) as a result of which those persons
together would have more than 25 percent of the aggregate power
to influence or limit the exercise of the trustee's authority.
(3) If persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor resident aliens
have the power to direct or remove a trustee, either directly or
indirectly through the control of another person, the trust instrument must provide that those persons together may not have more
than 25 percent of the aggregate power to direct or remove a
trustee. Nothing in this paragraph prevents those persons from
18 2
having more than 25 percent of the beneficial interest in the trust.

In addition, the FAA amended the provisions of section 47.41
of the FAA regulations'83 to provide for the termination of the
effectiveness of aircraft registration in the name of a trustee who
(i) Loses United States citizenship;
(ii) Loses status as a resident alien and does not become a citizen
of the United States at the same time; or
182
183

Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939.
14 C.F.R. § 47.41 (1979).
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(iii) In any manner ceases to act as trustee and is not immediately
replaced by another who meets the requirements of § 47.7(c). ' "
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, even before one
reaches an analysis of the regulatory response of the FAA to the
statutory direction in section 501 (b) of the 1958 Act to define
the term "based and primarily used in the United States," the
foray of the FAA into the theretofore uncharted area of trust
creation and administration is an example of intelligent decisionmaking. One may disagree with particulars of the formulation of
the trustee provisions, but one cannot deny the fact that difficult
issues were addressed and compromises reached in the context
both of sound legal reasoning and of practical application.
As is often the case with ambitious projects, the attempt to deal
with major substantive issues raises important questions for further
discussion. In the case of the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation, some of these questions involve, not problems or errors, but
the delineation of the changing roles and functions that particular
institutions must play and perform after the promulgation of the
Final Regulation. The necessity for, and the difficulties involved
in, ascertaining the relevant facts must be explored. Other questions involve the extent of the reach of the principles in the Final
Regulation to analogous situations. Finally, the manner of specific
application of certain rules contained in the trustee provisions of
the Final Regulation must be analyzed.
The substance of the trustee provisions, and the scope of the
substantive legal questions addressed, contemplate and require
the reaching of accurate factual and legal conclusions by institutions not theretofore required to do so. It is in the interest of these
institutions, practitioners, commentators, and other interested persons to recognize the effort and time required for faithful adherence
to the Final Regulation, and to work together to develop means
and procedures for obtaining the relevant facts and for reaching
the proper legal conclusions.
The most obvious institution affected is the FAA itself. It must
appreciate the quality and quantity of the tasks that it has undertaken in the administration of the Final Regulation. It is incumbent upon the FAA to develop proper and consistent practices in
I" Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940.
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dealing with the many practical questions that will arise from the
Final Regulation. The FAA has put itself in the position of reviewing the trust instrument and loan documentation involving
trustees. It must analyze the quality of title held by a trustee.
Does the documentation provide for "legal title" to be held "in
trust," for the purposes of the application of the trustee provisions
of the Final Regulation? To some extent, the FAA will find itself
dealing with issues of state law, whether under section 506 of the
1958 Act" or otherwise. The FAA will have to consider which
persons are "beneficiaries," within the meaning of the Final Regulation. The agency will have to review the affidavit required of
the trustee in connection with beneficiaries, with respect to form
and substance, which review in turn requires a review of the provisions of the trust instrument and loan documentation creating or
recognizing the power of the beneficiaries "to influence or limit
the exercise of the trustee's authority" and "to direct or remove
[the] trustee."'' .
The foregoing discussion does not contemplate that the FAA
has, by reason of the promulgation of the Final Regulation, converted itself into an investigative body in connection with aircraft
registrations, and the authors do not advocate a major change
in emphasis in this direction based on a reading of the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation. The FAA will, in all probability,
want to develop the practice of relying, as to the accuracy of certain facts and the propriety of certain legal conclusions, on certain documents and opinions that appear proper on their face; or
the FAA, in some cases, may accept showings that conform to
the Final Regulation. In any event, the practical steps by which
the FAA attempts to administer the Final Regulation should be
widely publicized, and the views of practitioners, commentators,
and representatives of the aviation community should be solicited.
The other institution that, under the Final Regulation, finds itself
"' Section 506 of the 1958 Act states the following choice-of-law principle:
The validity of any instrument the recording of which is provided for by section 503 of this Act shall be governed by the laws
of the State, District of Columbia, or territory or possession of
the United States in which such instrument is delivered, irrespective
of the location or the place of delivery of the property which is
the subject of such instrument.
49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (§§ 47.7(c)(2)(ii), .7(c)(3)).
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in a position of responsibility for facts and legal conclusions is
the trustee in an aircraft financing. The trustee has not heretofore
been required to investigate and take responsibility for the legal
status of its beneficiaries. Now, in some way, it must be involved
in ascertaining the citizenship status of its beneficiaries (after discovering who its beneficiaries are, for this purpose).18 The trustee
must obtain sufficient assurances (written or otherwise) from its
beneficiaries to permit it to give the relevant affidavit called for by
the Final Regulation-namely, under section 47.7(c) (2) (ii)
thereof, an affidavit stating that "each beneficiary under the trust,
including each person whose security interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust, is either a U.S. citizen or a resident alien
[as each such term is defined in the Final Regulation]"; 8. or, under
section 47.7(c) (2) (iii) thereof, an affidavit stating that
the trustee is not aware of any reason, situation, or relationship
(involving beneficiaries or other persons who are not U.S. citizens
or resident aliens) as a result of which those persons together
would have more than 25 percent of the aggregate power to influence or limit the exercise of the trustee's authority. 89
The authors hope and trust that the FAA would accept a statement in the first affidavit that the information contained therein
is presented to the best knowledge of the trustee, or on the basis
of information provided by the beneficiaries. With respect to section 47.7(c) (2) (iii) of the Final Regulation, " ' the trustee must
assure itself that it understands the provisions of the trust instrument regarding the direction or removal of the trustee, and the
operation of such provisions in the context of foreign beneficiaries.
If there is sufficient difference of opinion as to the meaning of the
trustee provisions of the Final Regulation, the trustee may consider the desirability of including language of immunity in the
187 Even though the trustee in aircraft financings is generally thought to be
appointed and to act for the benefit of investors, and not for the borrower or
user of the aircraft, the trustee nevertheless may owe duties to the borrower
or user. For example, if the trustee is construed to be a "secured party," as
defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (1972 version), then U.C.C. § 9-207(1)
(1972 version) requires the trustee to "use reasonable care in the custody and
preservation of collateral in his possession." Id. This duty is owed to the "debtor,"
as defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1972 version).
" Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (§ 47.7(c)(2)(iii)).
189 Id.
190 Id.
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documentation to protect the trustee against any liability stemming
from its acting upon directions from beneficiaries. In general, the
trustee must understand and appreciate the issues raised by the
foreign-beneficiary provisions of the Final Regulation, and the
effect of these issues on the ordinary administration of the trusts
created by the trust instrument. In particular, the trustee must be
sensitive to the question of changes in the citizenship status of
beneficiaries (whether by corporate reorganizations, sales of assets
or stock, sales of interests in the trust, or otherwise) at the time
of any beneficiary action to influence, direct, or remove the
trustee."'
The scope of the factual and legal determinations to be made
in connection with, or in the application of, the Final Regulation
is important to note at the outset of the analysis because the
authors believe that a few problem areas exist in the Final Regulation. The purpose of the following discussion is not to announce
firm conclusions with respect to the questions raised (the full analysis of certain of which would require treatment beyond the scope
of this Article), but to open the door to examination and analysis
of the Final Regulation by the FAA and private parties interested
in the content and application of the Final Regulation.
The first issue involves the applicability of the trustee provisions
of the Final Regulation. In particular, to what extent, if any,
are the trustee provisions applicable to a mortgage on aircraft
held by a trustee for the benefit of debtholders? At first blush,
the prefatory language of section 47.7 (c) of the Final Regulation
would seem to limit application of the trustee provisions to a trustee
that "holds legal title to an aircraft in trust.".... Legal title, accordingly, would be a necessary element, and, since the lien of a mortgage on aircraft would, at least under the Uniform Commercial
Code," ' constitute a security interest in personal property and not
"'

Text accompanying notes 204-06 inIra contains a further discussion of

the issue of the change of beneficiary citizenship.

112
Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (S 47.7(c)).
19 The interrelationship of the 1958 Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
(Code),

in all its manifestations relating to federal preemption of state law,

construction and application of federal law, construction and scope of federallydictated choice-of-law principles, and construction and application of choiceof-law principles established by the various versions of the Code, is in itself
a fascinating area for study, and is an appropriate subject for another article.
The more limited exercise of discovering the legal relationships arising from a

1980]

FOREIGN-OWNED AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION

51

a present ownership interest, the trustee provisions of the Final
Regulation would not seem to be applicable to an aircraft mortmortgage on aircraft, by requiring an analysis of the interplay between the
1958 Act and the Code, illustrates the operation of Code provisions and evidences
the magnitude of the achievement of the Code draftsmen.
Section 503 of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976), directs the Secretary
of Transportation to establish and maintain a central registry for instruments
affecting the title to or an interest in aircraft. Based upon the knowledge that
federal law mandates a system of central filing, one would suspect that Article 9
of the Code, U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 507 (1972 version), would contain a provision acknowledging federal preemption of state law in this area. In fact, Article
9 contains two such provisions. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1972 version) specifies that
Article 9 is inapplicable "to a security interest subject to any statute of the
United States," but goes on to indicate that Article 9 is only inapplicable "to
the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties
affected by transactions in particular types of property." Id. As if this provision
were not clear enough, U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (1972 version) states that the filing
of a U.C.C. financing statement is not "necessary or effective" to perfect a security
interest in property subject to "a statute or treaty of the United States which
provides for a national or international registration . . . or which specifies a
place of filing different from that specified in this Article for filing of the
security interest." Id.
Although the 1958 Act requires a central registry for instruments affecting
specified types of property (e.g., aircraft), and, in S 503(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c)
(1976), clearly indicates the legal consequences of filing instruments for recordation in such central registry, the 1958 Act does not purport to establish or affect
substantive "rights of parties to . . . transactions." In fact, § 506 of the
1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976), states that the "validity" of any instrument recordable in the central registry is "governed by the laws of the State,
District of Columbia, or territory or possession of the United States in which
such instrument is delivered, irrespective of the location or place of delivery
of the property which is the subject of such instrument." Id.
Based upon the foregoing, although the FAA is in effect empowered to determine, in connection with the submission of an instrument for filing for
recordation in the central registry, whether, for the purposes of the 1958 Act,
such instrument affects the title to or an interest in "aircraft," the 1958 Act
does not distinguish among types of property for any other purpose. Accordingly,
one looks to the Code for this purpose, and finds that aircraft fall within the
definition of "goods" in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h) (1972 version) -namely,
"all
things which are movable at the time the security interest attaches or which are
fixtures . . . but . . . [excluding certain other specified types of property]." Id.
In fact, aircraft constitute "mobile" goods for the purposes of the choice-oflaw rules contained in U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(a) (1972 version).
Having established that aircraft fall within the definition of a term used in
Article 9, we must determine whether Article 9 applies to a mortgage on aircraft. U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1972 version) states that, except as otherwise provided in U.C.C. § 9-104, Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of
its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property
or fixtures including goods." U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1972 version). As discussed
above, since the recording provisions of the 1958 Act do not purport to govern
the substantive rights of parties to contractual arrangements, the reference in
U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1972 version) to U.C.C. § 9-104 does not qualify the
applicability of Article 9 to a mortgage of aircraft, if the mortgage evidences
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gage, and inquiry would not have to be made with respect to the
citizenship of the debtholders secured by the mortgage.
Notwithstanding this analysis, the authors feel that the issue is
somewhat clouded for two reasons. The first reason involves the
interplay among the Proposed Regulation, a comment letter delivered to the FAA in response to the Proposed Regulation, and the
response contained in the Final Regulation. The second reason involves the legal relationships created upon and in connection with
the foreclosure of a mortgage upon aircraft.
As discussed above,' the FAA gave serious consideration to
comment letters delivered in response to the Proposed Regulation.
Several proposals in one comment letter"' were cited approvingly
by the FAA, and were incorporated in one form or another in
the Final Regulation."' However, that comment letter also contained the following proposal:
The regulation should make it clear that the reference to beneficiaries of a trust is to owner participants or other persons having a beneficial interest in the ownership of the aircraft. It can
be argued that loan participants in a leveraged lease transaction,
who are beneficiaries of a security interest in the aircraft, might be
regarded as beneficiaries under the proposed regulations. Neither
the Federal Aviation Act nor the Federal Aviation Regulations
limit or prohibit foreign financial institutions and other lenders
from obtaining security interests (as distinguished from ownership interests) in U.S. registered aircraft; we believe the regulation should be clarified to avoid imposing such limitations."'
an intent to create a "security interest." The term "security interest" is defined
in U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972 version) to mean "an interest in personal property
or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation," and the
term includes the "retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer." Id. Accordingly, assuming the
absence of provisions in the aircraft mortgage negativing the intention of the
parties to create a "security interest," the interest of a trustee holding a lien
on aircraft under an aircraft mortgage would be a "security interest" under the
Code, and Article 9 of the Code would apply to establish the rights and duties
of the parties to the mortgage transaction.
194See text accompanying notes 107-16 supra.
195 Perkins, Coie Letter, supra note 110. See also Final Regulation, supra note
8, at 61,937.
'"See Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,937, 61,939 (FAA discussion of
proposals; S 47.7(c)(3) (final sentence)).
" Perkins, Coie Letter, supra note 110.
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In response to this proposal, the FAA made the following statement in the discussion section of the Final Regulation:
One commenter [sic] believes that the limit on the percentage
of foreign beneficiaries who have authority to direct or remove
trustees, should not apply to beneficiaries who have only a security
interest in the aircraft. However, the rule is intended to apply
to these persons since the control which they may exercise over
a trustee can be as substantial as that of any other beneficiary.
Accordingly, the rule, as adopted, makes it clear that references
to beneficiaries under a trust include any person whose security
interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust.'
Immediately after this statement, however, the FAA noted that
[i]t is not the intent of the FAA in any way to change its existing
procedure for accepting applications for registration in the name
of a trustee wherein the trustee and beneficiaries are all citizens
of the United States, regardless of whether the trust is an active
or a passive trust.""
The operative provisions of the Final Regulation!' contain, after
the appropriate reference to beneficiaries under a trust, the words
"including each person whose security interest in the aircraft is
incorporated in the trust."
The FAA has clearly rejected the proposed interpretation of the
concept of "beneficiary" of a leveraged lease financing involving
equity investors and loan participants. However, as the comment
letter points out, a contrary rule throws into doubt the clear inapplicability of the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation to a
trustee holding a mortgage lien on aircraft for the benefit of debtholders. Presumably, if at the time of registration the trustee and
all the debtholders are United States citizens and/or green-card
aliens, the issue is moot. The issue of change of beneficiaries, however, discussed later in this Article,' then becomes relevant.
The second reason that the trustee relationship created under
the ordinary corporate trust indenture and mortgage raises a question under the Final Regulation is that the legal relationship among
the parties may change radically after a default. Prior to default,
19'Final
199 Id.

Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,938.

200d.

at 61,939 (§§ 47.7(c)(2)(ii), .7(c)(2)(iii)).

201 See

text accompanying notes 204-06 infra.
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as analyzed above, the trustee/mortgagee ordinarily would be
construed to have a lien on the aircraft, and the debtor/mortgagor
would remain the legal and beneficial owner. However, after a
default, and in accordance with the provisions of the mortgage and
applicable law, the trustee could take title to the aircraft by foreclosure or other means. Upon such a contingency, what is the
extent of the applicability of the Final Regulation to the trustee?
One answer is that, if the trustee and all the debtholders are citizens of the United States, there is no problem. The practical answer
to this assertion is to ask the question whether the trustee, at the
point of title passage, must obtain confirmation that all the debtholders are citizens of the United States."2 Assuming arguendo
that the passage of title requires an inquiry by the trustee into the
citizenship of the debtholders, and assuming that such an inquiry
results in a finding that certain debtholders are not citizens of
the United States (or green-card aliens), the trustee may find itself
in an untenable position. The governing trust instrument, presumably, does not contain provisions that preclude foreign debtholders
from influencing, directing, or removing the trustee. If the trust
instrument is to be amended to reflect the disenfranchising of
foreign debtholders, under the instrument, presumably, the foreign
debtholders would have the power to veto such an amendment.
Even if the questions raised in the prior paragraph lead one to
the conclusion that it would be a "good idea" for every trust indenture covering aircraft to contain appropriate language regarding foreign debtholders, the provisions that must be drafted to
deal with the foregoing contingencies may well be construed by
the participants in a transaction as needlessly complicating already
complicated documents."° In addition, the questions are not always
susceptible to quick and easy solution. For example, the exact
moment at which the foreign-beneficiary restrictions would be
triggered is not at all clear. Would it be at the time of registration
of the aircraft in the name of the trustee? At the moment of foreclosure under state law? If the aircraft is disposed of pursuant to
the exercise of a power of sale contained in the instrument, at
what time would the relevant provisions come into play? Also, the
2 2

See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1980).
authors have been involved in aircraft financings requiring, in each

203 The

case, a mortgage exceeding 150 printed, single-spaced pages in length.
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manner in which the foreign-beneficiary provisions would be administered by the trustee in the context of a mortgage is unclear.
For example, in an aircraft fleet mortgage, how would a trustee
administer the trust under which it holds a lien on certain aircraft,
but has foreclosed title on other aircraft?
At this point, another possible problem surfaces. The citizenship
of a beneficiary may change, without advance notice to or knowledge by the trustee. The citizenship could change as a result of a
corporate reorganization, a sale of assets, a sale of stock, the
transfer of an interest in the trust, or otherwise. Such a change
could be either within or outside the control of the beneficiary
itself. The trustee provisions of the Final Regulation speak expressly to one point in time-namely, the point at which a trustee
makes application for aircraft registration. Moreover, as a technical matter, with respect to a trustee holding title to aircraft, the
Final Regulation mandates that the effectiveness of a certificate of
aircraft registration, unless suspended or revoked earlier, terminates upon the date when
the trustee in whose name the aircraft is registered(i) Loses United States citizenship;
(ii) Loses status as a resident alien and does not become a
citizen of the United States at the same time; or
(iii) In any manner ceases to act as trustee and is not immediately replaced by another who meets the requirements of
§ 47.7(c).In other words, the FAA has not expressly provided that the effectiveness of a registration of aircraft in the name of a trustee as
holder of legal title could be jeopardized by a change in the citizenship status of any beneficiaries.
Although this analysis seems sound on the basis of the text of
the Final Regulation, at least two considerations arise. First,
although the provision of the Final Regulation quoted in the preceding paragraph mandates the termination of the effectiveness of
aircraft registration as the result of changes in the citizenship or
status of the trustee (and not of its beneficiaries), the FAA, were
it to become concerned about the problem of changes in beneficiary citizenship, could seek to apply the provisions of section
m Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940 (§ 47.41(a)(9)).
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47.41 (a) (4) of the FAA regulations ° to the situation. This provision specifies the transfer of ownership of aircraft as an event
that triggers termination of the effectiveness of aircraft registration. The theory propounded might be that changes in citizenship
of beneficiaries, coupled with the absence of language in the trust
instrument limiting foreign-beneficiary control of the trustee, in
effect work a transfer of ownership of aircraft from a "citizen of
the United States" to a non-United States citizen. The authors
believe that any such application and theory would reflect a
strained reading of this provision, and would recommend either
explicit confirmation from the FAA that the effectiveness of aircraft registration cannot be jeopardized by a change in the citizenship status of beneficiaries of the trust, or an admission by the
FAA that the matter is not free from doubt and that a policy will
be formulated on the basis of views solicited from practitioners,
commentators, and industry spokesmen.
The second consideration arising from the foregoing analysis
of changes in beneficiary citizenship consists of a simple admonition to the FAA: whatever the analysis of the problem, a trustee
appointed and acting under a trust instrument must adhere to its
terms. This fact must be remembered by the FAA in the course
of developing practices and policy to deal with issues arising in
the administration of the Final Regulation (including, perhaps,
some of the questions raised in this Article). An appreciation of
the trustee's role (and, in some cases, its predicament) should enter
not only into the formulation of the principles of application of
the Final Regulation but also into the discussion of the question
of retroactivity of the Final Regulation, touched upon later in
this Article.'
The next general problem area of the Final Regulation involves
the meaning and application of the percentage limitation to be
imposed on the voting power of foreign beneficiaries. Although the
FAA, in response to a comment letter," ' states in the Final Regulation that nothing in the trustee provisions "prevents . .. [beneficiaries who are neither U.S. citizens nor green-card aliens] from
- 14 C.F.R. § 47.41(a)(4) (1980).

"See text preceding note 217 inf ra.
Perkins, Coie Letter, supra note 110.
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having more than 25 percent of the beneficial interest in the trust,"' 8
two specific provisions require that the voting power of foreign
beneficiaries be limited. Sub-clause (iii) of section 47.7 (c) (2) '
of the Final Regulation requires the delivery to the FAA of an
affidavit from the trustee to the effect that the trustee is not aware
of any "reason, situation, or relationship" as a result of which
foreign beneficiaries together would have "more than 25 percent
of the aggregate power to influence or limit the exercise of the
trustee's authority.""' In addition, clause (3) of section 47.7(c).'
of the Final Regulation requires that the trust instrument provide
that foreign beneficiaries together may not have "more than 25
'
percent of the aggregate power to direct or remove a trustee."')
The first question that arises is whether the FAA is intending to
draw, in the context of provisions of a trust instrument, some kind
of subtle distinction between the "power to influence or limit the
exercise of the trustee's authority" and the "power to direct or
remove a trustee." Presumably, any beneficiary could "influence"
the exercise of a trustee's authority by communicating with the
trustee and providing arguments why the trustee should follow a
particular course of action. The authors believe that the FAA
does not intend to impair in any way the communication of ideas
between any beneficiary and its trustee. The concept of the power
to "limit the exercise of the trustee's authority" in one sense is a
corollary of the power to "direct" a trustee. In other words, the
power to direct a trustee necessarily involves the power to prevent
a trustee from taking certain discretionary action. In another sense,
an action could be proscribed as limiting the exercise of the trustee's authority, while not falling within customary notions of directing a trustee. One example might be an amendment of the
provisions of the trust instrument relating to the trustee's powers
and immunities.
Although one may be tempted to indulge in distinctions between
the two foregoing concepts, the authors have concluded that the
concept of "directing the trustee" is broad enough to include the
2o0Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (§ 47.7(c)(3) (final sentence)).
'Id. (5 47.7(c)(2)(iii)).
210Id.

1'd. (5 47.7(c)(3)).
21Id.
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concept of "limiting the trustee's exercise of authority," and that
the latter language probably derived from the provision of the
Proposed Regulation that focused upon "any foreign interest which
could influence or limit the exercise of totally independent judgment by a trustee.''. The concepts of "influence" and "limit[ing]
the exercise" of judgment have particular meaning in relation to
a standard of "totally independent judgment by a trustee" (a
standard that, however, was eliminated by the FAA in drafting
the Final Regulation).
Having concluded that the concern of the FAA is with the power
to direct or remove a trustee under the trust instrument, we must
examine the manner in which the percentage limitation on foreignbeneficiary voting power is to be applied. The first step is to identify
the provisions of the trust instrument that could be construed to
involve directing or removing a trustee. Included would be provisions (1) authorizing acceleration by the trustee of any indebtedness or obligation, (2) permitting amendments or waivers of provisions, (3) speaking to waivers of default, (4) relating to the
resignation, removal, and succession of a trustee, and the appointment, resignation, removal, and succession of co-trustees or separate trustees, and (5) expressly recognizing the power of beneficiaries to direct the trustee to take or refrain from taking certain
specified actions. It is not unusual to see trust instruments drafted
to provide for differing percentages of beneficiary interests to be
required or permitted in connection with amendments of a trust
instrument, or the administration of the trusts thereunder. For
example, twenty-five percent of beneficiary interest may be required
for acceleration of the indebtedness or obligation secured by or
created under the trust instrument; fifty-one percent may be required for amendment; sixty-six and two-thirds percent may be
required for waivers of default and rescissions of acceleration;
and even one hundred percent may be required for amendments
changing the terms of the interest of the beneficiaries or adversely
affecting the trust estate or security for the interest of the beneficiaries.
There is no discussion in the Proposed Regulation or the Final
Regulation of the manner in which the percentage limitation is
intended by the FAA to be integrated into the structure of a trust
213 Proposed

Regulation, supra note 90, at 67 (§ 47.7(c)(2)(i)).
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instrument. The percentage limitation is specific, and perhaps the
FAA believed it to be self-explanatory. Yet, as the following discussion will show, the simplicity may be deceptive.
The first theory for application of the percentage limitation contemplates the simple and direct incorporation of the percentage
limitation into the "voting" provisions of a trust instrument. For
example, if foreign beneficiaries hold eighty percent of beneficiary
interest, and United States citizens hold the remaining twenty percent, and if fifty-one percent of the beneficiary interest is required
for removal of the trustee, the foreign beneficiaries, under this
theory, would have voting power in the aggregate equal to
twenty-five percent of the beneficiary interest. In other words, irrespective of the percentage of beneficiary interest required to authorize any action by the trustee, if foreign beneficiaries hold more than
twenty-five percent of beneficiary interest, their voting power is reduced to twenty-five percent. Accordingly, if all the foreign beneficiaries were to vote in favor of removing the trustee, the action
taken to remove the trustee would not be effective without the vote
of United States citizens amounting in voting power to at least
twenty-six percent of the beneficiary interest.
At this point, the inquiry turns to the measurement of the voting
power of the United States citizens. If the voting power of the
foreign beneficiaries is equivalent to twenty-five percent of the
beneficiary interest, and if the foreign beneficiaries vote in favor
of removing the trustee, without an "adjustment" in the calculation
of the voting power of the United States citizens, the sum of the
voting power of the foreign beneficiaries and the twenty percent
interest of the United States citizens would not result in enough
"votes" to remove the trustee (even though all beneficiaries have
voted to remove the trustee)! Assuming that this result is not a
proper consequence of the FAA rule, even this rather straightforward theory would seem to require a proportionate increase in
the voting power of United States citizens in order to offset the reduction in the number of votes permitted to be cast by foreign beneficiaries. In other words, in the foregoing example, at the same
time as the eighty percent interest of the foreign beneficiaries translates into a twenty-five percent interest for voting purposes, the
twenty percent interest of the United States citizens becomes a
seventy-five percent interest. Presumably, the voting interest of
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each foreign or United States beneficiary, as the case may be, consists of a proportionate percentage of the voting power, as calculated above.
The foregoing theory represents a direct incorporation of the
percentage limitation into the voting structure of a trust instrument, and, as has been demonstrated above, this "direct" application may in itself require some subtle practical refinements. Despite
its relative simplicity, however, this theory has shortcomings, based
both on the wording of the Final Regulation and on the practical
application of such a rule. The Final Regulation, when speaking
to the beneficiary interest as a general concept, uses the words
"persons . . . having . . . the beneficial interest in the trust,.'...
and, when addressing the issue of voting interest, uses the words
"persons ... [having] the power to direct or remove a trustee. ' ..
The distinction between beneficiary interest in the trust, and beneficiary voting power, seems to have been clear in the mind of the
FAA. If the FAA had intended the percentage limitation to be
calculated simply on the basis of the beneficiary interest in the
trust, one suspects that the Final Regulation would not have specified the percentage limitation in terms of "25 percent of the aggregate power to direct or remove a trustee," but in words like "the
aggregate power to direct or remove a trustee not exceeding 25
percent of the beneficial interest in the trust." By utilizing the concept of voting power, the FAA evidences the recognition that a trust
instrument can define beneficiary power in a manner not directly
related to the amount of beneficiary interest.
The practical distinction between the quantum of actual voting
power and the quantum of beneficiary interest becomes starkly
apparent when the theory under discussion is applied to the foregoing example, in the context of an acceleration of indebtedness
created under the trust instrument. If the trust instrument provides
that the trustee must accelerate the indebtedness created by the
trust instrument upon receiving a request, in proper form, from the
holders of twenty-five percent of the beneficiary interest, the foreign
beneficiaries in our example (eighty percent of beneficiary interest
held by foreigners; twenty percent held by United States citizens,)
have sufficient votes to require the trustee to accelerate the in214 Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,939 (§ 47.7(c)(3)
215
Id.

(final sentence)).
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debtedness, and the voting power of the United States citizens is
insufficient to block the action by the foreign beneficiaries.
The foregoing example should make it clear that construing
the Final Regulation to limit foreign voting power to a specified
percentage of beneficiary interest (namely, twenty-five percent)
results in a theory that does not take notice of the distinctions that
may be drawn by a trust instrument in the importance of various
actions, evidenced by the differing percentages of beneficiary interest specified to permit or require different actions. Put in other
terms, the foreign beneficiaries in the foregoing example in fact
have one hundred percent of the voting power required to compel
the trustee to accelerate the indebtedness, not merely twenty-five
percent. Likewise, if a trust instrument specifies that the removal
of the trustee requires fifty-one percent of the beneficiary interest,
the foreign beneficiaries could very well be construed as having
nearly forty percent of the voting power in that context.
Although the question is not at all free from doubt, the authors
believe that limiting the voting power of foreign beneficiaries to
twenty-five percent of the aggregate voting power should probably
mean limiting the voting power of foreign beneficiaries to twentyfive percent of the minimum percentage of beneficiary interest required for each particular action involved. For example, if fiftyone percent of beneficiary interest is required to remove the trustee,
the foreign beneficiaries collectively could represent no more than
twelve and three-quarters percent of the aggregate beneficiary interest (and, presumably, the voting power of each foreign beneficiary would be its proportionate percentage of the twelve and
three-quarters percent of beneficiary interest specified above).
This theory of the proper application of the percentage rules of
the Final Regulation creates some interesting results. For example,
even under circumstances in which foreign beneficiaries hold in
the aggregate less than twenty-five percent of the total beneficiary
interest, the foregoing theory would require a reduction in this
percentage in order to determine their voting power. If foreign
beneficiaries hold in the aggregate twenty percent of the total beneficiary interest, and if fifty-one percent of the total beneficiary interest is required to remove the trustee, the foreign beneficiaries
hold more than twenty-five percent of the voting power to remove
the trustee (in fact, nearly forty percent), and the twenty percent
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interest of the foreign beneficiaries would, in the context of voting
power to remove the trustee, be converted into twelve and threequarters percent of the total beneficiary interest."' In addition, the
percentage rules create problems for the draftsman of trust instruments in transactions involving aircraft. The draftsman will have
to be sensitive both to the citizenship of beneficiaries at the time of
execution and delivery of the trust instrument, as well as to the
effect of changes of citizenship of beneficiaries on the operative
provisions of the trust instrument.
The authors hope and trust that the foregoing, necessarily
limited, discussion of the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation
will trigger consideration by the FAA and lead to broad discussion among interested persons and between interested persons and
the FAA. To the extent that this consideration and discussion lead
to the clarification of the FAA's policy and practice in the administration of the Final Regulation, we would hope that the FAA will
seriously analyze whether, or the extent to which, any refinements
of the trustee provisions of the Final Regulation should operate
prospectively and not retroactively. Our concern is that the premises
upon which parties have entered, and continue to enter, into transactions, whether as obligors, trustees, or beneficiaries, not be altered
by any regulatory action by the FAA in the future. For example,
the parties to an aircraft mortgage in the form of a trust indenture
involving only United States citizens should not be affected, with
respect to that transaction, by any future policies and practices of
the FAA with respect to issues such as the effect of the change in
citizenship of a beneficiary on the eligibility for continued registration of aircraft owned by the trustee. If retroactivity is required in
certain situations, the FAA should consider developing procedures
that are well-publicized in order to permit parties under existing
1' The percentage limitation on the voting power of foreign beneficiaries does

not take any account of the manner in which the voting power is exercised namely, whether foreign beneficiaries "vote" with or against other beneficiaries
who are United States citizens. Accordingly, if, for example, there are two
foreign beneficiaries, each having an aggregate interest in the trust greater than
twenty-five percent of the aggregate beneficiary interest in the trust, their aggregate voting power is reduced to twenty-five percent, and their individual voting
power is reduced to less than twenty-five percent of the aggregate beneficiary

interest, notwithstanding that one of the foreign beneficiaries actually votes with
those beneficiaries who are United States citizens.
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contractual arrangements to conform to the refinements of the
Final Regulation within a reasonable time period.
C. The "Based and Primarily Used" Test in the Final Regulation
The final sentence of subsection (b) of section 501 of the 1958
Act 17 delegated to the Secretary of Transportation the responsibility
for formulating, by regulation, a proper and workable definition
of the term that provided the linchpin of the privilege of noncitizen
corporations to own United States-registered aircraft. That term,
of course, was "based and primarily used in the United States."
The 1958 Act afforded little guidance in the area. Although the
1958 Act was very specific in identifying the type of legal entity
that was permitted to qualify (it had to be a corporation; it had
to have been organized under the laws of the United States or of
a state; and it had to be "doing business" under such laws),"28
the only term in the phrase "based and primarily used in the United
States" that was defined in the 1958 Act was the term "United
States." This term was defined in section 101(41) of the 1958
Act " to mean "the several States, the District of Columbia, and the
several Territories and possessions of the United States, including
the territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof."2 ' The
term "possessions of the United States," used in the definition of
"United States," was defined in section 101 (34)" 1 to mean possessions of the United States and, under certain circumstances, the
Canal Zone and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. ' The term
"based and primarily used" was not illuminated in the 1958 Act
(nor, to the knowledge of the authors, has it been used in any
other federal statute).
A reading of SFAR 39 demonstrates that, at a fairly early stage,
the FAA was placing more emphasis on the concept of the use of
aircraft, and less emphasis on the idea of basing aircraft. Although
the FAA clearly stated in SFAR 39 that it would develop the
21749 U.S.C.A.
218 The

§

1401(b) (West Supp. 1980).

authors must confess their doubt that any substantial consideration

of distinctions among the concepts of "qualified to do business," "doing business"
and "transacting business" entered into the drafting of this provision.
21949 U.S.C.A. § 1301(41) (West Supp. 1980).
22 Id.
22

2

1Id. at

n Id.

§ 1301(34).
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"based and primarily used" requirement in a future regulation, it
is apparent that the FAA thought the condition to eligibility set
forth in SFAR 39, was so clearly within the intent of Congress in
amending the 1958 Act that it could be stated as an interpretive
rule and a statement of general FAA policy. This rule was that
an aircraft, if owned by the proper legal entity, was eligible for
registration if it was "to be exclusively operated in the United
' '3
States during the period that it is registered in the United States. 2
The FAA employed the terms "used" and "operated" interchangeably throughout the discussion in SFAR 39, and the term "operate
aircraft" was, in fact, defined in section 101(31) of the 1958 Act
to mean "the use of aircraft, for the purpose of air navigation."*"
Although SFAR 39 did not contain extensive discussion of the
rule promulgated, the FAA clearly had concluded, as a matter
either of logic or of practicality, that the concept of basing of aircraft was subsumed under, or unimportant in light of, exclusive
operation of aircraft in the United States.
In developing the Proposed Regulation and the Final Regulation, the FAA continued its emphasis on the fact and amount of
flight of aircraft as the determinative factors in deciding under what
circumstances a noncitizen corporation would be permitted to
register its aircraft under United States law. With this foundation,
the rule in the Final Regulation is quite straightforward:
For the purposes of registration, an aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States if the flight hours accumulated
within the United States amount to at least 60 percent of the total
flight hours of the aircraft during(1) For aircraft registered on or before January 1, 1980, the
6-calendar month period beginning on January 1, 1980, and each
6-calendar month period thereafter; and
(2) For aircraft registered after January 1, 1980, the period consisting in [sic] the remainder of the registration month and the
succeeding 6 calendar months and each 6-calendar month period
thereafter.'
Furthermore, the rule makes clear that the term "flight hours accumulated within the United States" means
.SFAR 39, supra note 78, at 39.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(31) (West Supp. 1980).
'z Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940 (§ 47.9(b)).
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only those flight hours accumulated during non-stop (except for
stops in emergencies or for purposes of refueling) flight between
two points in the United States, even if the aircraft is outside of
the United States during part of the flight ....
The definition of "based and primarily used" contained in the
Proposed Regulation," and brought forward with certain refinements in the Final Regulation, has been " and can be criticized in
its particulars. However, it cannot validly be criticized as dogmatic,
inflexible, unduly expansive, or unduly restrictive. In fact, in ways
to be sketched herein,"2 ' it is both more expansive (in the sense of
limiting the extent of the contacts with the United States required,
and thereby broadening the privilege of registration of aircraft by
noncitizen corporations) and more restrictive than might have
been anticipated after the passage of the 1978 Amendment. We
will touch on these points in order.
As this Article has outlined, Congress had at one point passed
an amendment to the 1958 Act wherein the eligibility for registration of aircraft owned by noncitizen corporations was dependent
upon such aircraft's being "based or primarily used" in the United
States.' The final version of the provision, however, incorporated
the concept in the conjunctive-namely, "based and primarily
used.""' Accordingly, the FAA would have been within its clear
authorization under the 1958 Act to require aircraft owned by
noncitizen corporations to have substantial contacts with the United
States in connection with both the basing of aircraft and the operation of aircraft. The FAA, however, concluded that compliance
with the rule formulated resulted in such substantial contacts with
the United States that requiring additional contacts not involving
the actual flight of aircraft was unnecessary. The FAA stated, in
the Final Regulation, that it considered that
the requirement that 60 percent of the flight hours of the aircraft
be within the United States is sufficient to ensure that the aircraft
is based within the United States, a requirement that Congress
"'Id. (§ 47.9(c)).
"22 Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 67 (§ 47.9).
"I See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 230-48 infra.
mSee text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
" See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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imposed to prevent the use of U.S. registration as a "flag of
convenience." 2 '
This statement was included in the Final Regulation in response
to the criticism of two commentators ' to the effect that the FAA
did not acknowledge that basing and using were two separate concepts. Although that may have been a valid conceptual distinction,
and, indeed, would have been critical in the context of a "based
or primarily used" test, the emphasis upon the distinction under
circumstances in which the FAA had the clear power to impose
two sets of restrictions seemed to reflect insufficient appreciation
of the flexible position that the FAA was taking.Y
Another example of what might be characterized as an expansive
interpretation by the FAA in the Final Regulation involves the
concept of "United States." As mentioned above,' the definition
of "United States" in section 101 (41) of the 1958 Act' includes
territories, possessions, and territorial waters. However, since the
FAA (acting for the Secretary of Transportation) was authorized
and directed under the 1958 Act to define the term "based and
primarily used in the United States," and not merely the term
"based and primarily used," the FAA was not required to accept
that broad definition for use in the Final Regulation. The FAA,
however, explicitly discussed and approved the use of this definition
in the Proposed Regulation, ' and the Final Regulation reflected
no limitation of the concept. Moreover, having contemplated the
probability of flights between points in the "United States" that
involved flight time over the high seas or neighboring countries,
the FAA explicitly refused to deduct from the flight time between
two points in the "United States" all or any portion of the flight
time over the high seas or any such neighboring country."' The
Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,937.
mSee Shell Letter and NBAA Letter, supra note 113.
234Although the commentators made a point of distinguishing the concepts
of "based" and "used," they were probably more interested in using their analysis
as a springboard to argue for reduction in the "60 percent rule" (to a "51
percent rule") and to criticize the proposed requirement that, for the purpose of
calculating flight hours within the United States, only flights with points of
origin and destination in the United States would count.
. See text accompanying notes 219-22 supra.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(41) (West Supp. 1980).
2-2
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Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 64 (Part IV.B.).
Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940 (S 47.9(c)).
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full flight time counted in the calculation of the necessary flight
hours within the "United States," even though the flight time over
the high seas or other countries might constitute substantially all
the flight time between the two points in the "United States." The
FAA did not require allocation.
Although certain persons commenting on the Proposed Regulation" argued that the requirement in the Proposed Regulation
that at least sixty percent of total flight hours be accumulated
within the United States, was unduly burdensome, the adoption by
the FAA of a "sixty percent rule" must be considered to fall on
the expansive, rather than on the restrictive, side of the scale. The
FAA certainly must have been tempted to adhere to a seventy-five
percent rule with respect not only to the concept of beneficiary
control of a trustee but also to the concept of "primarily used."
Commonsense notions of primary use would have supported a
higher percentage than sixty percent of flight hours as a test.
Finally, taking into account the FAA's view of the relative unimportance of the basing of aircraft, the agency could well have required more substantial contact with the United States as a basis
for granting the privilege of United States registration to noncitizen
corporations.
As the reader can quickly gather from the foregoing, the authors
are not at all sympathetic to any criticism of the Final Regulation
that seeks to dismiss it as wholly arbitrary, unreasonable, or restrictive. However, there are restrictive elements in the definition
of "based and primarily used in the United States" contained in
the Final Regulation, which will be outlined below. " The authors
do not know at this point how to weigh the "restrictiveness" of
these elements. In the Final Regulation, as in any scheme of governmental regulation, the ultimate and immediate goals of the
regulation (including, in the case of the Final Regulation, stimulating and maintaining economic and social benefits by requiring
regular, continual, and substantial contacts of noncitizen corporations with the United States) must be considered in connection
with other values, including the ease and cost of administration
by the relevant agency and private parties, the predictability of
results, and the difficulty of evasion or subversion of regulatory
21 See Shell Letter and NBAA Letter, supra note 113.
240See text accompanying notes 241-48 infra.
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purposes. In the case of the Final Regulation, it will be in everyone's interest for the FAA to monitor the administration of the
Final Regulation and to be sensitive to hardships and to the frequency and volume of requests for special dispensation.
The first restrictive element involves the converse of a rule denominated as "expansive" in an earlier part of this Article." 1 This
element is contained in subsection (c) of section 47.9 of the Final
Regulation,' which credits toward meeting the sixty-percent requirement only those flight hours accumulated "during non-stop
(except for stops in emergencies or for purposes of refueling)
flights between two points in the United States."" In rejecting the
possibility of an allocation of flight hours between time spent in
United States airspace and time spent outside United States airspace, the FAA may have been sensitive to the possibility of circumvention of the requirement. For example, an operator, approaching the end of a six-month period for determining compliance, could artificially inflate the number of his flight hours in the
United States, by changing schedules, taking circuitous routes in
connection with international trips, and otherwise.
Whatever the realistic possibilities or probabilities of abuse of
an allocation approach along the foregoing lines, the refusal to
allocate does appear to create some practical problems, which do
not at first glance appear to create public benefits. For example,
noncitizen corporations cannot fully exploit the business of nonstop flights from interior cities of the United States to border areas
of Mexico or Canada, without, in each case, an unnecessary stop
on the United States side of the border. Again, the authors do not
have any particular feeling for the economic effects of the rule in
these situations, nor for the extent to which the FAA considered
and specifically resolved these and similar problems. The FAA did
consider a proposal to allow the counting of flight time between
a point in the United States and a point outside the United States,
but concluded, without explicit analysis, that such an approach
would not "ensure that the aircraft is used primarily in the United
States, as intended by Congress."'" The FAA will have to monitor
2'1See text accompanying note 238 supra.

2uFinal Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940 (S 47.9(c)).
2
a Id.
2

" Id. at 61,937.
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the operation of this rule in order to determine whether, or the
extent to which, the risks of an allocation approach are outweighed
by economic and social benefits.
Clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section 47.9 of the
Final Regulation!' establish fixed six-month periods for the determination of compliance with the rules. The FAA does not dictate
when a noncitizen corporation must register aircraft, and, therefore,
the noncitizen corporation desiring to reap the benefits of the expanded registration provisions can analyze anticipated business
cycles and desired routes and time its application for registration
accordingly. If mistake or change of circumstances causes the
choice of a particular six-month period to work hardship, the
owner can take steps to deregister the aircraft and reregister the
aircraft at an appropriate time (complying with the law during any
period when the aircraft is not registered under United States law).
Despite the foregoing flexibility, the question arises whether the
costs of administration by the FAA and private parties, the lack
of predictability, and/or the ease of circumvention would outweigh
the benefits of a more liberal approach-namely, permitting the
use of "floating," rather than fixed, six-month periods. The issue
involves the extent and nature of the seasonality of demand for
aircraft services, and the flexibility of the FAA-established sixmonth periods to accommodate this seasonality under circumstances in which it should be accommodated. Again, perhaps we
must rely on the wisdom of hindsight after the FAA has had the
opportunity to monitor this rule.
Certain comment letters" on the Proposed Regulation criticized
the record-keeping requirements of the Proposed Regulation, 7
which were incorporated (with certain changes) in the Final
Regulation. ' Any additional requirements of reporting to a governmental agency are always anathema to a business. However,
such requirements are a small price to pay for the privilege of
United States registration. The Final Regulation, however, does
not explicitly recognize the difficulty and time involved in assembling and summarizing the data, and preparing and submitting the
m Id. at 61,940 (§ 47.9(b)).
2'0 See Shell Letter and NBAA Letter, supra note 113.
"7Proposed Regulation, supra note 90, at 67 (S 47.9(e)).
5Final Regulation, supra note 8, at 61,940 (§§ 47.9(e), .9(f)).
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report. The FAA should consider establishing a policy that explicitly permits the registrant a fixed number of days (perhaps
thirty) after the end of each six-month period, during which the
registrant is permitted to submit the relevant report without fear
of violating the Final Regulation.
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the history and development of one
recent governmental regulation in an attempt to illustrate the nature and magnitude of the tasks that may devolve upon administrative agencies as a result of Congress' inability or unwillingness
to provide clear and comprehensive statutory direction. It was the
goal of this Article to show that, on the basis of broad authority
conferred upon it, its own expertise, and its belief in its own institutional integrity and responsibility to the public, an administrative
agency is capable of operating successfully to identify and deal in
a reasonable manner with the many issues that must be resolved
in the course of fashioning a statement of legislative policy into
regulations that work.
The authors do not contend that the regulation that provides the
focus of this Article will not engender any public inconvenience or
interpretive difficulty, nor do we argue from a single example that
all, or even most, regulatory action embodies more virtue than
vice. Rather, this Article should be regarded as sounding a note of
caution to those who, wielding broad-bladed axe, would endanger
the healthy branches of our regulatory system along with those that
truly need to be pruned.

